Dialectical materialism - Revision history

Kasp: Added how Engels used the term materialist dialectic in ludwig feuerbach.

2026-04-14T08:43:13Z

Added how Engels used the term materialist dialectic in ludwig feuerbach.

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:43, 14 April 2026
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	The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. [...] The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.}}</ref>		The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticised nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion. [...] The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell.}}</ref>

	Although it was a method conceived by [[Marx]] and [[Engels]], the term ''dialectical materialism'' was never actually used by either, but appropriately summarizes their philosophical outlook. In the preface and second chapter of [[Library:Socialism: utopian and scientific\|''Socialism: ~~utopian~~ and ~~scientific~~'']], Engels calls it "modern materialism".		Although it was a method conceived by [[Marx]] and [[Engels]], the term ''dialectical materialism'' was never actually used by either, but appropriately summarizes their philosophical outlook. In the preface and second chapter of [[Library:Socialism: utopian and scientific\|''Socialism: Utopian and Scientific'']], Engels calls it "modern materialism," and in part four of [[Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy\|Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy]], Engels calls it "materialist dialectic."

	Per Wayne Au's [[Library:A Marxist Education Learning to Change the World\|A Marxist Education]], a basic summary of dialectical materialism's elements:		Per Wayne Au's [[Library:A Marxist Education Learning to Change the World\|A Marxist Education]], a basic summary of dialectical materialism's elements:

185.209.199.130: Grammar, capitalization

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Grammar, capitalization

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CriticalResist: Correct citation template for ref 6 (Dialectical Logic)

2025-11-09T00:08:10Z

Correct citation template for ref 6 (Dialectical Logic)

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	Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>		Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>

	The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{~~Web citation~~\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|~~newspaper~~=~~Marxists.org~~\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC		The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|year=1974\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC\|title-url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|chapter=Part Two – Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics\|section=8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development. [...]
	Part Two – Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics		All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.\|newspaper=\|date=\|url=}}</ref> </blockquote>
	8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic~~\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm~~\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development. [...]
	All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</ref> </blockquote>

	This understanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.		This understanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.

CriticalResist: formatting

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	However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental [[Geist]] (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.		However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental [[Geist]] (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.

	Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following, <ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the fea-tures of Semblance, externality and nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).}}</ref>		Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following,<ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the fea-tures of Semblance, externality and nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).}}</ref>

	Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>		Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>
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	8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development. [...]		8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development. [...]
	All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</ref> </blockquote>		All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</ref> </blockquote>


	This understanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.		This understanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.

CriticalResist: formatting

2025-11-08T22:13:46Z

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	However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental [[Geist]] (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.		However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental [[Geist]] (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.

	Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following, <ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has		Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following, <ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has constructed an objective picture of the world for himself, changes external actuality, abolishes its determinateness (= alters some sides or other, qualities, of it), and thus removes from it the fea-tures of Semblance, externality and nullity, and makes it as being in and for itself (= objectively true).}}</ref>
	constructed an objective picture of
	the world for himself, changes
	external actuality, abolishes its
	determinateness (= alters some
	sides or other, qualities, of it),
	and thus removes from it the fea-
	tures of Semblance, externality and
	nullity, and makes it as being in
	and for itself (= objectively true).}}</ref>

	Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>		Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>
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	The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Web citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC		The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Web citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC
	Part Two – Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics		Part Two – Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics
	8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development......		8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development. [...]
			All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</ref> </blockquote>


			This understanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.

	~~......~~All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</~~ref~~> </blockquote>		<blockquote>All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the '''''social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual,''''' i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.<ref name=":0" /></blockquote>

			This is the basis of how [[Karl Marx\|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels\|Engels]] rejected Spinoza, that history is essentially made of potential tendencies which arise from material conditions (say a revolutionary situation birthed from the inherent contradictions of class society), the realization of this potential tendency ultimately lies with actors within the system (of course the actors are not separate or merely observant within the system but rather within it and their tendency to act itself is materially conditioned towards materializing the potential tendency - understanding this is how dialectical materialism comes to reject both idealistic voluntarism and mechanical materialism).

	~~This undertanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism~~, ~~Laplacean pre~~-~~determinism~~ and ~~Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism~~ from ~~crude materialists who go with~~ the ~~simple matter~~ -~~> mind circuit~~, ~~and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (~~but not ~~determinate) system~~, ~~in fact~~, ~~the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory~~ and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the ~~general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits~~.		<blockquote>Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.<ref>{{Web citation\|author=Karl Marx\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\|date=1852\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm\|quote=Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.}}</ref></blockquote>

	~~<blockquote>~~


	All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the '''''social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual,''''' i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.<ref name=":0" />

	~~</blockquote>~~


	This is the basis of how [[Karl Marx\|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels\|Engels]] rejected Spinoza, that history is essentially made of potential tendencies which arise from material conditions (say a revolutionary situation birthed from the inherent contradictions of class society), the realization of this potential tendency ultimately lies with actors within the system (of course the actors are not separate or merely observant within the system but rather within it and their tendency to act itself is materially conditioned towards materializing the potential tendency - understanding this is how dialectical materialism comes to reject both idealistic voluntarism and mechanical materialism).<blockquote>


	Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.<ref>{{Web citation\|author=Karl Marx\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\|date=1852\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm\|quote=Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.}}</ref></blockquote>
	Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.		Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.

76.110.202.57: Removed a repeated paragraph

2025-10-22T02:31:58Z

Removed a repeated paragraph

← Older revision		Revision as of 02:31, 22 October 2025
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	Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.<ref>{{Web citation\|author=Karl Marx\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\|date=1852\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm\|quote=Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.}}</ref></blockquote>		Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.<ref>{{Web citation\|author=Karl Marx\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\|date=1852\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm\|quote=Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.}}</ref></blockquote>
	Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.

	Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.		Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.

Comrade Kiwi at 14:13, 13 October 2025

2025-10-13T14:13:22Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:13, 13 October 2025
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	Later on, the philosopher [[Hegel]] used ''dialectics'' to describe the progress of ideas (thoughts) through contradiction, the process of their development toward a supreme and absolute spirit.<ref>'''V. Adoratsky'''. ''Dialectical materialism'' ''- the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism'', pg. 22-23</ref> Hegel's fundamental question was: where do ideas come from? How come this or that person had the idea to invent, say, the telephone? How come we didn't have the idea for it earlier? By answering this question, he brought dialectics to a fuller form as compared to the Ancient Greek dialectics, though Hegelian dialectics were idealist; that is, Hegel's answer to "where do ideas come from?" was simply: God gives us our ideas. In this case, God should not be understood as the literal Christian God, but more as a concept that attempts to answer the question.		Later on, the philosopher [[Hegel]] used ''dialectics'' to describe the progress of ideas (thoughts) through contradiction, the process of their development toward a supreme and absolute spirit.<ref>'''V. Adoratsky'''. ''Dialectical materialism'' ''- the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism'', pg. 22-23</ref> Hegel's fundamental question was: where do ideas come from? How come this or that person had the idea to invent, say, the telephone? How come we didn't have the idea for it earlier? By answering this question, he brought dialectics to a fuller form as compared to the Ancient Greek dialectics, though Hegelian dialectics were idealist; that is, Hegel's answer to "where do ideas come from?" was simply: God gives us our ideas. In this case, God should not be understood as the literal Christian God, but more as a concept that attempts to answer the question.

	However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental Geist (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.		However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental [[Geist]] (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.

	Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following, <ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has		Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following, <ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has

Comrade Kiwi: Simplified the circuit I wrote quite a bit, and few other changes to make the text more accessible.

2025-10-02T17:15:03Z

Simplified the circuit I wrote quite a bit, and few other changes to make the text more accessible.

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:15, 2 October 2025
Line 30:		Line 30:
	Later on, the philosopher [[Hegel]] used ''dialectics'' to describe the progress of ideas (thoughts) through contradiction, the process of their development toward a supreme and absolute spirit.<ref>'''V. Adoratsky'''. ''Dialectical materialism'' ''- the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism'', pg. 22-23</ref> Hegel's fundamental question was: where do ideas come from? How come this or that person had the idea to invent, say, the telephone? How come we didn't have the idea for it earlier? By answering this question, he brought dialectics to a fuller form as compared to the Ancient Greek dialectics, though Hegelian dialectics were idealist; that is, Hegel's answer to "where do ideas come from?" was simply: God gives us our ideas. In this case, God should not be understood as the literal Christian God, but more as a concept that attempts to answer the question.		Later on, the philosopher [[Hegel]] used ''dialectics'' to describe the progress of ideas (thoughts) through contradiction, the process of their development toward a supreme and absolute spirit.<ref>'''V. Adoratsky'''. ''Dialectical materialism'' ''- the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism'', pg. 22-23</ref> Hegel's fundamental question was: where do ideas come from? How come this or that person had the idea to invent, say, the telephone? How come we didn't have the idea for it earlier? By answering this question, he brought dialectics to a fuller form as compared to the Ancient Greek dialectics, though Hegelian dialectics were idealist; that is, Hegel's answer to "where do ideas come from?" was simply: God gives us our ideas. In this case, God should not be understood as the literal Christian God, but more as a concept that attempts to answer the question.

	However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental Geist (or Spirit) on it's journey to Absolute Knowing through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.		However, Hegelian dialectics by themselves lack this answer: in the idealist conception of history, our ideas happen before our material conditions. That is, we get ideas in our head, and then act upon them and change material conditions. Hegel himself asserted an external transcendental Geist (or Spirit) on it's journey to [[Absolute Knowing]] through a dialectical process which was simultaneously materially conditioned in realization but transcendent in being. This however creates a rift, lying in the fact that the Geist, transcendental in being but materially conditioned in realization, there is no internal base rooted in what is to be transformed in the material realm, the material body thus does not carry the seeds of its own negation but is instead reconciled with an external and transcendental Geist making reconciliation impossible because of the rift in realms as the tools for building a material edifice are described as being above the very material edifice they seek to build.

	Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following,		Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following, <ref>{{Web citation\|author=V.I. Lenin\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=Conspectus of Hegel’s Science of Logic, Book III (Subjective Logic or the Doctrine of the Notion)\|date=1914-09 to 1914-12\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/cons-logic/ch03.htm\|quote=The activity of man, who has
			constructed an objective picture of
			the world for himself, changes
			external actuality, abolishes its
			determinateness (= alters some
			sides or other, qualities, of it),
			and thus removes from it the fea-
			tures of Semblance, externality and
			nullity, and makes it as being in
			and for itself (= objectively true).}}</ref>

	Material reality is primary and exists regardless of the precence or abscence of human observation (however the human exists in tandem and within this material reality and can thus affect material conditions after being shaped by them) -> ~~This gives rise to the consciousness (~~a material ~~phenomenon in the same realm of existence as all else)~~ -> ~~This~~ consciousness ~~is largely reflective of material conditions and subjected to bending by these conditions~~ -> ~~(Consider this step - LP) Through this dialectical process~~, ~~emerges the articulate conscious understanding of~~ material ~~realities the particular is situated within~~ (in ~~the context of class struggle specifically~~, ~~this is class consciousness) -> Due to this process~~, ~~the~~ consciousness ~~(which was a material phenomenon and not a separate dualist entity)~~ becomes a material force ~~-> The material force then acts back on material~~ conditions ~~-> Material conditions transform because of this new variable -> A new material base (in the context of class struggle~~, a ~~mode of production) arises -> Consciousness once again transforms to reflect the new material base and is conditioned by it~~ -~~> Step - LP -> So and so forth~~.<blockquote>		Material reality shapes consciousness -> Consciousness becomes a force that changes material reality -> New material reality shapes consciousness again -> The cycle continues. Being determines consciousness, but consciousness can then change being. Thoughts and awareness arise from material conditions (we don't think in a vacuum), once formed, consciousness becomes a real material force that can actually transform those same conditions. It's a feedback loop, not a one-way street. <blockquote>

	The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Web citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC		The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Web citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC

Comrade Kiwi at 18:54, 30 September 2025

2025-09-30T18:54:04Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:54, 30 September 2025
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	This undertanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.		This undertanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.

	<blockquote>All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the '''''social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual,''''' i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.<ref name=":0" />		<blockquote>

	</blockquote>This is the basis of how [[Karl Marx\|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels\|Engels]] rejected Spinoza, that history is essentially made of potential tendencies which arise from material conditions (say a revolutionary situation birthed from the inherent contradictions of class society), the realization of this potential tendency ultimately lies with actors within the system (of course the actors are not separate or merely observant within the system but rather within it and their tendency to act itself is materially conditioned towards materializing the potential tendency - understanding this is how dialectical materialism comes to reject both idealistic voluntarism and mechanical materialism).<blockquote>
			All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the '''''social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual,''''' i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.<ref name=":0" />

			</blockquote>


			This is the basis of how [[Karl Marx\|Marx]] and [[Friedrich Engels\|Engels]] rejected Spinoza, that history is essentially made of potential tendencies which arise from material conditions (say a revolutionary situation birthed from the inherent contradictions of class society), the realization of this potential tendency ultimately lies with actors within the system (of course the actors are not separate or merely observant within the system but rather within it and their tendency to act itself is materially conditioned towards materializing the potential tendency - understanding this is how dialectical materialism comes to reject both idealistic voluntarism and mechanical materialism).<blockquote>


	Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.<ref>{{Web citation\|author=Karl Marx\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\|date=1852\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm\|quote=Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.}}</ref></blockquote>		Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.<ref>{{Web citation\|author=Karl Marx\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.\|date=1852\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-brumaire/ch01.htm\|quote=Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.}}</ref></blockquote>
			Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.

	Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.		Marx and Engels were first inspired by Hegel's works and ideas, but later developed a better understanding of reality and its progress and development by applying the dialectical logic to material reality, observing the historical development of society. They put dialectic back ''right-side up,'' by divorcing it from its idealist roots and correctly associating it with materialism. To the question of ''where do our ideas come from?'' Dialectical materialists reply: from the brain, as the result of a chemical interaction. But the content processed in these chemical interaction itself comes from our material conditions; the reality in which we live. Indeed, we know for example that the Ancient Greeks had experimented with steam machines. Yet they didn't use them for industrial production, and steam only gained traction in the industrial revolution when we found out about its power output. Idealists would say that the idea already existed in the time of the Ancient Greeks, but the fact that they ''did not use steam technology'' (and it was limited to a couple experiments) shows us material conditions are more important than having the right idea. Essentially, the possibilities of steam did not fit into the Greek mode of production, whose societies by and large relied on slave labor, and couldn't have developed the industry necessary to run steam machines.

Comrade Kiwi at 18:53, 30 September 2025

2025-09-30T18:53:29Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 18:53, 30 September 2025
Line 34:		Line 34:
	Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following,		Marxist philosophical materialism collapses this rift by rooting the contradiction of the material world in the material world itself. The Marxist and dialectical materialist conception in contrast posits the following,

	Material reality is primary and exists regardless of the precence or abscence of human observation (however the human exists in tandem and within this material reality and can thus affect material conditions after being shaped by them) -> This gives rise to the consciousness (a material phenomenon in the same realm of existence as all else) -> This consciousness is largely reflective of material conditions and subjected to bending by these conditions -> (Consider this step - LP) Through this dialectical process, emerges the articulate conscious understanding of material realities the particular is situated within (in the context of class struggle specifically, this is class consciousness) -> Due to this process, the consciousness (which was a material phenomenon and not a separate dualist entity) becomes a material force -> The material force then acts back on material conditions -> Material conditions transform because of this new variable -> A new material base (in the context of class struggle, a mode of production) arises -> Consciousness once again transforms to reflect the new material base and is conditioned by it -> Step - LP -> So and so forth.<blockquote>The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Web citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC		Material reality is primary and exists regardless of the precence or abscence of human observation (however the human exists in tandem and within this material reality and can thus affect material conditions after being shaped by them) -> This gives rise to the consciousness (a material phenomenon in the same realm of existence as all else) -> This consciousness is largely reflective of material conditions and subjected to bending by these conditions -> (Consider this step - LP) Through this dialectical process, emerges the articulate conscious understanding of material realities the particular is situated within (in the context of class struggle specifically, this is class consciousness) -> Due to this process, the consciousness (which was a material phenomenon and not a separate dualist entity) becomes a material force -> The material force then acts back on material conditions -> Material conditions transform because of this new variable -> A new material base (in the context of class struggle, a mode of production) arises -> Consciousness once again transforms to reflect the new material base and is conditioned by it -> Step - LP -> So and so forth.<blockquote>

			The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development.<ref name=":0">{{Web citation\|author=Evald Ilyenkov\|newspaper=Marxists.org\|title=DIALECTICAL LOGIC
	Part Two – Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics		Part Two – Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics
	8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development......		8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic\|date=1974\|url=https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm\|quote=The old materialism set out from a conception of man as part of nature but, not bringing materialism as far as history, it could not understand man in all his peculiarities as a product of labour transforming both the external world and man himself. By virtue of that the ideal could not be understood as the result and active function of labour, of the sensuously objective activity of social man, as the image of the external world arising in the thinking body not in the form of the result of passive contemplation but as the product and form of active transformation of nature by the labour of generations succeeding one another in the course of historical development......
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	......All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</ref> </blockquote>This undertanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.		......All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual, i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.}}</ref> </blockquote>


			This undertanding is what fundamentally distinguishes materialist dialectics from Hegelian idealism, Laplacean pre-determinism and Spinoza's determinism. This dialectical mediation separates Marxist philosophical materialism from crude materialists who go with the simple matter -> mind circuit, and in doing so strip agency of individual actors within the wider law governed (but not determinate) system, in fact, the very reason this dialectical mediation is important to acknowledge is because of the unity of theory and method wherein not acknowledging this leads to stagnation because of notions of revolutionary fatalism, and thus inaction. The materially conditioned revolutionary human will in historically conditioned circumstances is the general image that the dialectical materialist framework posits.

	<blockquote>All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the '''''social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual,''''' i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.<ref name=":0" />		<blockquote>All general images, however, without exception, neither sprang from universal schemas of the work of thought nor arose from an act of passive contemplation of nature unsullied by man, but took shape in the course of its practical, objective transformation by man, by society. They arose and functioned as forms of the '''''social-man determination of the purposive will of the individual,''''' i.e. as forms of real activity. General images, moreover, were crystallised in the body of spiritual culture quite unintentionally, and independently of the will and consciousness of individuals, although through their activities. In intuition they appeared precisely as the forms of things created by human activity, or as ‘stamps’ (‘imprints’) laid on natural, physical material by man’s activities, as forms of purposive will alienated in external substance.<ref name=":0" />