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			[[Category:Incomplete library works]]
	[[Category:Library works about Stalin]]		[[Category:Library works about Stalin]]
	[[Category:Library works about the Moscow trials]]		[[Category:Library works about the Moscow trials]]

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			that I didn't know which army I would command. Would I be on the western front (and I knew that I would be on the western front), command the army, which will be deployed in the Polotsk region, or would I be in the Slutsk direction? It's hard for me now to say anything specific. Depending on my place in case of war, this issue would be resolved. Uborevich replied to this: "Well, it's clear that you will command the army on the right flank on the western front, you will advance on Riga and, quite naturally, with rapid advancement (and it was assumed that there would be no major enemy forces in that direction) the army, which I would lead would expose its flank or rear to the enemy, who could strike from Vilno."

			This was in 1935, at the beginning of the discussion of this issue.

			In 1936, when the military game of the General Staff was held, I, under the leadership of Uborevich, was indeed in command of the army on the western front. There, at the very beginning of the development of the operation, such a decision was made by Uborevich, although at the face-to-face confrontation<ref>Russian, ''ochnaya stafka'', where an accused is permitted to confront his accuser(s). A normal part of Soviet investigation.</ref> he did not want to admit that we had a conversation about it at the beginning of 1935. So, at a military game in 1936 he made a decision that the army that I was commanding,

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			regardless of the fact that it was not the centre, had to get the assignment of advancing on Riga. This does not mean that I would have reached Riga. I might have reached Gelovo or Novo-Aleksandrovsk or Ovintsovskaya, but in any case I would have been in such a position that, leading the offensive, I could be defeated.

			It is quite natural that at this meeting it was by no means possible to make any final defeatist decision. Here only the general directives, given by Tukhachevsky, were decided.

			At the same meeting, from among the questions concerning defeatism, the question was raised that in the event of war there would be significant difficulties if we carry out the directives that are now accepted as harmful in organising the army and military rear and, most likely, we will have a huge clogging of the rear.

			In this context, there was talk at the meeting which I attended. Since I did not participate in a series of discussions that Tukhachevsky conducted with the commanders of the forces or their deputies, many of whom worked in the border districts and were part of the counterrevolutionary organisation, the details that I heard today from the speeches of Yakir and Uborevich,

			/ 91 /

			were not known to me, just like I did not know about the central apparatus, because our activities included a large degree of conspiracy. It is completely clear to me that the whole series of questions that were set forth today by Tukhachevsky, Yakir, and Uborevich were apparently not brought to my attention for reasons of conspiracy. Until the fall of 1931 Tukhachevsky kept me informed about matters to the extent, as it seemed to me, of what was necessary for my work in the Moscow district. Regarding the Moscow district, I regularly informed him how the work was progressing. I can say the following with regard to those who were in the Moscow district: I personally recruited Germanovich, who later went to work in the Byelorussian military district and continued to work in the same direction in the Byelorussian district.

			Further, Kosich, who had been recruited by Uborevich, worked with me. I personally established this in October of that year when I was at Uborevich's apartment on Tukhachevsky's instruction. I met Kosich there, and the three of us discussed the question of what was the situation with the most important assignments at the moment before the Moscow district.

			Uborevich confirmed that for the Moscow District, as for the inner district, the main issue was the selection of cadres for the army apparatus, which should be allocated to the Western Front, and that we must work with Kosich on this issue.

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			I can also note that Veklichev, who, according to his own words, was recruited by Yakir, together with me, had been carrying out sabotage work together with me since the fall of 1931. Gorbachev, after he returned from the Far East, worked as my deputy and was my assistant in the wrecking work. After my departure to the Military Academy, he served as Commander of the Moscow District for about 7-8 months and continued the work that he and I carried out until September 1936.

			I must focus more on general political principles, on the ultimate goals and prospects, as they were described to me personally. In 1931, when I began my talk with Tukhachevsky, he explained the situation like this: we must unquestionably go with Rykov. It was not advisable at the time to defend Trotsky, since he had lost authority in the country. But soon thereafter, in 1932, Trotsky was mentioned more and more often. and then in 1933 when the fascist coup took place in Germany, among those leaders under whose flag we were supposed to go were: Rykov, Bukharin, and Trotsky. Later, Tukhachevsky began to state, not by hinting but openly, that in the end the political group that would come out on top was hard to predict, whether Rykov or Trotsky, and that we military men must consider ourselves not as playthings in the hands of the politicians, but must have the strong hand of a military man, and he began to lead the talks in the direction of Bonapartism.

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			This was from about the second half of 1934. In particular, Tukhachevsky expressed his thoughts most clearly and visible in this respect (something that he decided to refuse to admit today for some reason) on 29 November 1934 when Tukhachevsky and Putna were visiting me. In addition to them, Kosich and Gorbachev were present. Then I met alone with Tukhachevsky and Putna and talked about political prospects. Then it became clear that it was necessary to consider Tukhachevsky as the future dictator. Whether Tukhachevsky talked so frankly to the whole organisation I can't say for sure, but from the conversations with Uborevich I got the impression that Uborevich quite clearly knew the position taken by Tukhachevsky in our organisation. Next I have to say something regarding espionage. On 9 June, when I was interrogated by the prosecutor of the USSR, Vyshinsky, he asked me whether I consider myself a German agent. I replied to the prosecutor that I did not consider myself a German agent. Now I must amend my confession and, first of all, note that our entire organisation as a whole should be considered as fascist-German espionage agents. Our organisation could not be considered differently, and although at that moment, if I personally did not transfer secret documents, whether to Blomberg, Adam, or Koestring, this does not in any way reduce my guilt.

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			I take back the statement that I made to Vyshinsky because of my personal mood. I must plead guilty in this part as well as other members of our organisation. How were contacts established with the German Reichswehr? The establishment of communication, as noted by Tukhachevsky, began with the fact that in 1925 he travelled to Germany. Then in 1926, when I commanded the Byelorussian military district, Tukhachevsky invited a group of Germans to a manoeuvre, which he organised for Germany.

			When I was appointed to Germany as a military attaché, Tukhachevsky gave me the precise assignment to try to find out if the Germans remembered Tukhachevsky and what they thought about the manoeuvres that Tukhachevsky carried out showing the forces to the Germans. My assistant in Berlin, Shnitman, and I sent to the Red Army Intelligence Directorate for Tukhachevsky the answer that the Germans remembered Tukhachevsky, remembered the manoeuvres very well, and remember the friendly attitude that they met on the part of Tukhachevsky in 1936. In 1928–29, when I was in Germany, the main group of people who later became part of our organisation managed to pass through the German Reichswehr (one year or six months for equal persons in different ways), was Yakir, Uborevich, Eideman, and other individuals.

			It was quite natural that from that time we can confirm that, for our organisation, which

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			emerged later in 1931, a good soil was set up for further ties with the German command. As it was noted here, this business was called "collaboration". But if it was collaboration to a certain extent in the sense that persons from us went there and persons from the German Reichswehr came to us, then at the same time with this cooperation there also developed espionage activity.

			The matter took a completely different turn in 1931, when General Adam came to Moscow. He was with me and with Tukhachevsky. Even before the arrival of Adam, Tukhachevsky warned me that General Adam was expected, that we needed to speak with him and find out how Blomberg looked at our situation and what the future prospects were in general. When Adam was with me, he told me that he and Blomberg were quite satisfied that we had plans to carry out a coup with the help of a military organisation, that in the near future, obviously in Germany, the same thing would happen (he hinted at the Hitler coup). My meeting with Adam did not last long. Later I learnt from Tukhachevsky that Adam talked to Tukhachevsky in more detail, and one of the main points that was solved by Tukhachevsky and Adam was the question that the communication between Tukhachevsky and Adam would

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			go through the military attaché in Moscow, Koestring, that even if a fascist coup did take place in Germany, Koestring would remain in Moscow regardless of this coup, and that he was a reliable person. Blomberg trusted him, I could rely on him and transmit information through him.

			Somehow it turned out that the five of us were assembled, and Tukhachevsky told us that we would keep in touch through Koestring, that he did not mind that each of us individually would have meetings with Koestring, but it was necessary that Tukhachevsky be aware in advance if Koestring needed to be given any secret materials or documents and that he wanted to keep this issue in his own hands.

			Over the years, a number of members of our organisation, and I personally had meetings with Koestring at diplomatic receptions. At these receptions, the situation sometimes did not go smoothly, inn the sense of being able to talk to Koestring, especially after the fascist coup, when it was necessary to show, on the surface, isolation from representatives of the German army.

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			Nevertheless, since the meetings were private, it was possible at these receptions for either myself, or Tukhachevsky, or Eideman, or other persons who came to the diplomatic reception to have conversations.

			What kind of conversations did Koestring have with me? First of all, I remember that the conversation was about manoeuvres that were attended by the Germans in the Moscow district in 1931–32. I must say that then everything was openly and frankly shown to the Germans. They were put in a better position than representatives of other armies. Since the materials were given to them on manoeuvres, my main question revolved around those exercises or manoeuvres that were attended by representatives of the German army, including Koestring.

			Further, Koestring began to raise questions to me on a broader scale. He began to be interested in the situation of the Byelorussian and Leningrad districts. Moreover, I sometimes found myself in such a situation when I was presented with an awkward picture: since I, to some extent, had lost contact with the Byelorussian District, it turned out that Koestring had even more accurate information than me on specific garrisons.

			I attended several conversations, when the three of us, I, Tukhachevsky, and Koestring talked about the western border districts.

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			I also remember one conversation about the Far East in the presence of Eideman, when Koestring was interested in the issue of railway construction in the Far East and stated that he was expecting information, but he did not have this information yet. Tukhachevsky promised to provide him with this information.

			The President: In what year was this conversation?

			Kork: If I am not mistaken, this conversation took place in 1934 or in 1935. I can't remember the exact date. This was soon after the former German ambassador Dirksen left Moscow for Japan. Koestring said that he needed this information to transmit to Dirksen, who would coordinate it with the Japanese General Staff.

			At that time I did not know that very important materials were being transmitted about mobilisation plans and the development of industry. I learnt about some facts from the indictment, I learnt about others today. However, at the same time I had full clarity on the basis of those conversations that were at these receptions in my presence about three times with the participation of Tukhachevsky, that materials were being transmitted. I had no precise information concerning these materials. Regarding my work during the last period, I must say that recently I worked at the

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	== Notes ==		== Notes ==

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Literallywho Ingodsname at 19:02, 26 February 2024

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	{{Library work\|title=Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy\|image=Trotsky and the military conspiracy book cover.png\|author=Grover Furr, Vladimir L. Bobrov, Sven-Eric Holmström\|publisher=Erythros Press and Media\|published_date=~~5 January~~ 2021\|type=Book\|isbn=0578816032}}'''''Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy: Soviet and Non-Soviet Evidence Evidence; with the Complete Transcript of the "Tukhachevsky Affair" Trial''''' is a book written by [[United States of America\|Statesian]] professor [[Grover Furr]], published by [[Erythros Press and Media]] in 2021.		{{Library work\|title=Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy\|image=Trotsky and the military conspiracy book cover.png\|author=Grover Furr, Vladimir L. Bobrov, Sven-Eric Holmström\|publisher=Erythros Press and Media\|published_date=2021-01-05\|type=Book\|isbn=0578816032}}'''''Trotsky and the Military Conspiracy: Soviet and Non-Soviet Evidence Evidence; with the Complete Transcript of the "Tukhachevsky Affair" Trial''''' is a book written by [[United States of America\|Statesian]] professor [[Grover Furr]], published by [[Erythros Press and Media]] in 2021.
	== Acknowledgements and Dedication ==		== Acknowledgements and Dedication ==
	I wish to express my gratitude to Kevin Prendergast, Arthur Hudson – Arthur, may you enjoy your well-deserved retirement! — and Siobhan McCarthy, the skilled and tireless Inter-Library Loan librarians at Harry S. Sprague Library, Montclair State University.		I wish to express my gratitude to Kevin Prendergast, Arthur Hudson – Arthur, may you enjoy your well-deserved retirement! — and Siobhan McCarthy, the skilled and tireless Inter-Library Loan librarians at Harry S. Sprague Library, Montclair State University.

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