International Monetary Fund: Difference between revisions

International Monetary Fund
International Monetary Fund
	Logo
Founded	27 December 1945
Headquarters	Washington, D.C., United Sttaes

← Older edit Newer edit →

VisualWikitext

Revision as of 17:18, 25 March 2025

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is a neoliberal financial organization. Although it is a global organization, 38% of it is controlled by France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and United States.^[1] The IMF and its fellow Bretton Woods institution, the World Bank, have been led by a European and a US national since their inception, in what has been described as a "gentleman's agreement"^[2] despite demands for a merit-based, transparent process to be instated.^[2]

Upon membership in the IMF, member countries deposit a sum of money known as a quota subscription, denominated in special drawing rights (SDR),^[3]^[4] which determines how much money they can draw from the IMF, with the sum also determining the voting power of the member country.^[5]^[3] In return for financial assistance from the IMF, borrower countries must implement a set of economic reforms, typically referred to as structural adjustment programs (SAPs).^[5] The reforms stipulated by the IMF typically impose austerity measures, increase privatization, and weaken social services.^[6] The requirement to implement SAPs in order to receive loan installments is referred to as conditionality.^[4] Historically, conditionality was enforced primarily through compliance with SAPs. However, the IMF also began requiring a "letter of intent" to be submitted by governments requesting IMF loans, with prior actions, quantitative performance criteria, and structural benchmarks to be approved for a loan.^[7]

In his 100-page resignation letter from the IMF, former IMF senior economist Davison Budhoo described the extensive and systematic statistical fraud used by the IMF to impose its policies on developing countries, and explained that the consequences of these policies led to massive poverty and starvation. In the letter, Budhoo wrote that the IMF's policies are made in "utter disregard to local conditions" and lead countries to "self destruct" and "unleash unstoppable economic and social chaos"^[8] and also compared the IMF's structural adjustment policies to a "terrorist attack".^[9] He also stated that the routine policy packages of the IMF "can never serve, under any set of circumstances, the cause of financial balance and economic growth"^[8] and that "the ill-gotten, inadvertent power that we revel in wielding over prostrate governments and peoples - can only serve to accentuate world tensions".^[10]

It has been noted by the Bretton Woods Project (BWP), a civil society organization critical of the IMF and World Bank, that the IMF and World Bank's ability to position their policy prescriptions as "best practice" supported by "robust" theoretical and empirical work oftentimes results in the internalization of Bank and Fund positions by scholars, development practitioners and finance ministers. Furthermore BWP notes that though the IMF and World Bank claim that their work contributes to global welfare and the fulfillment of human rights, these institutions "lack clear evidence" for their claims and have faced objections by a myriad human rights experts.^[11]

History

The IMF and World Bank, also known as the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs), were set up at a meeting of 44 country delegations in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA in July 1944.^[12] The idea behind this conference was ostensibly to help rebuild the international economic system after the Second World War and to promote international economic cooperation. They were based on the ideas of US Treasury Secretary Henry Morganthau, his chief economic advisor Harry Dexter White, and British economist John Maynard Keynes. While the establishment of these institutions was presented as a supposedly apolitical effort, they served as a method to defend or expand the reach of western capitalism in the face of a potential challenge from the Soviet Union, and to promote US interests in particular.^[6] The Soviet Union was present at the conference but chose not to join the IMF.^[13]^:37

In its early years, the IMF established a training institute which was attended by central bank officials from the global South.^[13]^:41

Economist Ismail Sabri Abdalla has summarized that the Bretton Woods conference was "essentially a conference about the monetary and financial problems of the industrialized capitalist countries" and that the IMF was not conceived to deal with the specific financial problems of Third World countries. Abdallah states that "[t]he choice made at Bretton Woods was, in the final analysis, the expression of power relations between the USA and its allies; it contributed greatly to the consolidation of US hegemony and a dominance—dependence relationship between the USA and the other countries which joined the IMF system." He explains that because the US dollar was held outside of the US as an international means of payment and reserve asset, the US was in a position to increase its money supply without giving rise to significant inflationary pressures at home, unlike other nations which could only deal with inflation for short periods before imposing deflationary measures.^[13]^:37-41

In 1964, the Group of 77 (G77) emerged at the end of the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).^[14] The G77's aims were intended to enable global South countries to articulate and promote their collective economic interests, enhance their joint negotiating capacity, and promote South-South cooperation^[15]—considerations which had been effectively unaddressed at the Bretton Woods conference twenty years prior, when many of the concerned countries were still under colonial rule.^[16]

The IMF's scheme of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was established in 1969. As distribution of SDRs was based on quotas, the majority went to the industrialized countries, with Third World countries receiving about 25% of the first issue.^[13]^:43-45

From the Second World War until the 1970s, Keynesianism held influence in bourgeois economic thinking. Keynesianism regarded the state as having a legitimate role in managing certain aspects of a capitalist economy. Also during that period, international economic regulation was enacted through the system of the gold standard. However, various events in the 1970s would come to influence significant changes in economic policy in the imperial core and the development of neoliberalism, which would emphasize the minimization of the state's influence in the economy. Additionally, the US would abandon the gold standard in 1971.^[17]

The turn toward neoliberal policies in the 1980s may be contrasted with earlier approaches, in which state intervention in maintaining economic stability and development was a norm, employing concepts such as import substitution industrialization (ISI) and the use of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).^[18] While such practices are sometimes described as having failed or are blamed for poor economic performance in the global South, it may be noted that imperialist-led institutions have been described as having instituted a financial "invisible blockade"^[19] against countries which pursued socialist or resource nationalist development strategies, using such tactics to purposely foment coups d'etat against leaders like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana (in 1966)^[20] and Salvador Allende in Chile (in 1973),^[19] after which right-wing, pro-West governments would be installed and IMF approvals and access to monetary aid and other benefits would open up,^[21]^[22] while the process of privatizations of state enterprises and selling off of national resources began.^[23]^[24] The 1973 coup in Chile and the subsequent implementation of the economic prescriptions of the "Chicago school" of Milton Friedman is often regarded as an important element in the development of what would come to be called neoliberalism, and come to dominate policy at the IMF and related institutions.^[25]^[26]

In the 1980s and 1990s, the policies advocated by the imperialist-led international financial institutions were inspired by the so-called "Washington Consensus" and focused on promoting neoliberal policies, implemented mainly via Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).^[6]^[27] According to the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, the mid-late 1980s was the high point of SAPs, when 64 countries had one in place.^[17]

In 1988, describing the internal attitude of the IMF at the time of this neoliberal shift, IMF whistleblower Davison Budhoo wrote that the IMF's aim was essentially to have the global South "'privatised' or die":

About five years ago President Reagan effectively told us to go out and make the Third World a new bastion of free wheeling capitalism, and how we responded with joy, and with a sense of mission! Of course the entire strategy for propagating Third World economic rebirth into unfettered free enterprise was finalized and explicitly stated in the Baker Plan of 1985 and in the eligibility criteria to Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility to the 62 'poorest' countries of the world. Thus everything we did from 1983 onward was based on our new sense of mission to have the south 'privatised' or die; towards this end we ignominiously created bedlam in Latin America and Africa in 1983-88.^[28]

By 1998, a Foreign Policy in Focus article commented that "[v]irtually all developing countries [...] have implemented or are in the process of acceding to SAPs."^[29]

By country

Argentina

In 2018, the IMF granted Argentina a $56.3 billion loan, causing austerity and privatization. The loan was given the year before an election to favor right-wing candidate Mauricio Macri, an ally of Donald Trump.^[30]

Indonesia

The IMF caused a banking crisis in Indonesia that decreased GDP by 14% and increased poverty by 40%.^[1]

Jamaica

By 1976, Jamaica had a deficit of $231.2 in Jamaican dollars. The IMF made Jamaica devalue its currency and increase exports. It also forced the government to cut wages, end subsidies and price controls, and privatize industry. The IMF austerity increased the prices of various food items by 71% to 285%. Real wages dropped by 35% in 1978 alone, and the unemployment rate was 30% in 1980.^[31]

Sierra Leone

The IMF made Sierra Leone devalue its currency, which also decreased the cost of its minerals, including diamonds. Increased diamond extraction led to a conflict that killed 70,000 people and displaced 2.6 million.^[1]

Ukraine

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych negotiated with the IMF before being overthrown in the 2014 Euromaidan coup. Because the IMF was demanding a decrease in wages and health and education spending, Yanukovych decided not to take the loan and began negotiating with Russia instead.

After the coup, the new government took a $26 billion loan from the IMF after cutting its gas subsidy for citizens by 50%. The IMF has offered Ukraine another loan after the beginning of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian conflict.^[32]

Yugoslavia

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Yugoslavia tried to borrow from the West to expand its economy. When a recession began in the West, the West banned Yugoslavia from exporting goods in order to put the country in debt. The IMF and World Bank forced Yugoslavia to restructure its economy by cutting social spending, freezing wages, eliminating worker-controlled enterprises, and increasing unemployment. Economic growth dropped from 7% per year in the late 1960s to under 3% by the 1980s and was negative by 1990.^[33]

Zambia

The IMF forced Zambia's government to eliminate subsidies for pesticides and fertilizers, decreasing agricultural output and leaving seven million people short of food.^[1]

COVID-19 pandemic

From January to October 2020, the IMF gave COVID-19-related loans to 81 countries, including 41 in Africa. The majority of these loans required countries to cut government spending or wages. 14 African countries were required to implement austerity measures in 2021 and 19 more had to by 2023.^[34]

A 2023 report by Human Rights Watch, analyzing 39 loan programmes from 2020 to 2023 and affecting a combined total of over 1 billion people, found that the austerity imposed by the IMF on recipient countries has led to an erosion of human rights, disproportionally affecting people with low incomes. This is despite the presence of social spending floors - a minimum that a country must spend on social services - which the IMF falsely claims helps protect the most vulnerable in societies from cuts in public spending. In reality, these social spending floors are improperly and vaguely calculated and many people face increased hardship regardless.^[35]

References

↑ ^1.0 ^1.1 ^1.2 ^1.3 Arman Tendulkar (2021-10-11). "The International Monetary Fund: A Vehicle for Modern Day Imperialism" International Policy Digest. Retrieved 2022-06-19.
↑ ^2.0 ^2.1 “The under-representation of low- and middle-income countries on the BWIs’ Executive Boards is exacerbated by the historic ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the United States and European countries, which has seen the Fund and Bank led by a European and US national, respectively, since their inception. Civil society has long called for this opaque system to be replaced with a merit-based, transparent process. However, the April 2019 appointment of World Bank President David Malpass – a US national who ran unopposed for the Bank’s top job – demonstrated that the gentleman’s agreement remains alive and well despite civil society opposition”

"What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?" (2019-06-04). Bretton Woods Project. Archived from the original on 2025-01-29.
↑ ^3.0 ^3.1 "IMF Quotas". International Monetary Fund. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.
↑ ^4.0 ^4.1 “SDR: Special Drawing Right. An internal account and reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund in 1970. The value of SDR's varies proportionately with a basket of five national currencies (the US dollar, sterling, deutschmark, the french franc and the yen). [...] SDR's are distributed among the participating countries in proportion to their IMF quota. Under the SDR facility, member countries of the IMF may use their SDRs either bilaterally to buy back their own currency from another member country if that country is willing to sell, or through the Fund. Under a so-called Standby Arrangement, member governments may borrow more than their quota, provided they satisfy the Fund that they observe certain key policy indicators prescribed by the Fund. This is referred to as IMF Conditionality.”

Ankie Hoogvelt (1987). The crime of conditionality: Open letter to the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Review of African Political Economy. doi: 10.1080/03056248708703717 [HUB]
↑ ^5.0 ^5.1 “How Does the IMF Operate?” Bretton Woods Project. August 23, 2005.
↑ ^6.0 ^6.1 ^6.2 “What Are the Main Criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?” Bretton Woods Project. June 4, 2019. Archived 2022-09-18.
↑ “While historically the IMF and Bank enforced conditionality primarily through SAPs, today, the IMF requires a ‘letter of intent’ from governments requesting a loan. To be approved by the IMF for a loan, the letter requires prior actions, quantitative performance criteria and structural benchmarks – the latter of which continues to contain structural macroeconomic policy reforms. Despite efforts to ‘streamline’ the number of conditions in the face of severe criticism, the IMF’s 2018 Review of Program Design and Conditionality found that the number of structural conditions is on the rise.”

"What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?" (2019-06-04). Bretton Woods Project. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.
↑ ^8.0 ^8.1 “Our policy package for Trinidad and Tobago - i.e. the conditionality that we are demanding for any Fund program, and the measures that we are asking the authorities to implement as a necessary precondition for a loosening of the iron grip that we now hold on the fortunes of the country in so far as its recourse to international capital markets and official bilateral donors are concerned - can be shown, even in a half-objective analysis, to be self-defeating and unworkable. That policy package can never serve, under any set of circumstances, the cause of financial balance and economic growth. Rather, what, in effect, we are asking the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to do is to self-destruct itself and unleash unstoppable economic and social chaos.”

Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough: 'Part I'.
↑ “Quite frankly, our "program" is nothing but a hotchpotch of irreconcilable and conflicting elements and objectives; it reduces economics to a farce. It is the recipe for comprehensive disorder and all enfolding disintegration of the fabric of national life - economic, political, social - without reason or rationale or sensitivity to the aftermath. More pointedly, our action in Trinidad and Tobago does not relate to any clear set of economic principles - however misguided and inappropriate such principles may be. We're just striking out wildly in every direction and at everything in our path; we strike out thus and we create maximum grief and confusion. It's like a terrorist attack, you know, splashing around rifle fire and bazookas and even nerve gas indiscriminately so as to get the highest death toll in the shortest possible time.”

Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough: 'Part IV'.
↑ “Self-defeating and unethical as it may seem, what we have done and are doing in Trinidad and Tobago is being repeated in scores of countries around the world, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. Sometimes we operate with greater restraint, sometimes with less, but the process and the result are always the same: a standard, pompous recital of doctrinaire Fund "advice" given uncompromisingly and often contemptuously and in utter disregard to local conditions and concerns and susceptibilities. It is the norm now rather than the exception, that when our "one-for-all and all-for-one" Fund cap doesn't fit the head for which it is intended, we cut and shave and mangle the head so as to give the semblance of a fit. Maybe we bust up the head too much in Trinidad and Tobago, but have no illusions that the way We operate throughout the world - the narrow and irrelevant epistemology underlying our work, the airs and affectations and biases and illusions of superiority of our staff vis-Á-vis government officials and politicians in the developing world, our outrageous salaries and perks and diplomatic immunities and multiple "entitlements", the ill-gotten, inadvertent power that we revel in wielding over prostrate governments and peoples - can only serve to accentuate world tensions, expand even further the already bulging ranks of the poverty-striken and destitute of the South, and stunt, worldwide, the human soul, and the human capacity for caring and upholding norms of justice and fairplay.”

Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough: 'Part I'.
↑ “While maintaining they have no obligations under international human rights law, despite objections of myriad human rights experts and the opinion of one of the Bank’s former General Counsels, both the Bank and Fund claim their work to eradicate poverty and increase economic growth and stability ultimately contributes to global welfare and the fulfilment of human rights, without clear evidence. First, this ‘win-win’ scenario has been the subject of countless critiques pointing to obvious trade-offs and conflicts between ‘pro-growth’ and ‘pro-equity’ policies, including in a paper by the IMF’s own research department in 2014.

Second, according to data on poverty rates, the vast majority of the poverty eradication achieved during the last 40 years is actually largely attributed to China, which has certainly not followed the policy prescriptions of the BWIs (see Observer Winter 2017-2018), while the IMF’s 2018 conditionality review found several IMF programmes where “debt overshot projections by significant margins, reflecting disappointing growth and higher fiscal deficits”, with lower programme completion rates. Additionally, the pace of poverty reduction is reportedly slowing, while the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa is increasing, and even the way the Bank measures poverty levels remains highly disputed. These and other critiques call into question the efficacy of the BWIs’ policy prescriptions more generally and their theoretical ability to effectively contribute to the fulfilment of human rights in the first place.”

"What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?" (2019-06-04). Bretton Woods Project. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.
↑ Kurt Schuler and Mark Bernkopf (2014). Who was at Bretton Woods?. [PDF] New York: Center for Financial Stability.
↑ ^13.0 ^13.1 ^13.2 ^13.3 Ismail-Sabri Abdalla (1980). The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the IMF. [PDF] Development Dialogue.
↑ Muchkund Dubey (2014-05-16). "The Historic Importance of G-77" UN Chronicle.
↑ "About the Group of 77". The Group of 77 at the United Nations.
↑ “The major Third World presence was that of the Latin American countries (which were all there except Argentina). Africa and Asia were represented by only seven countries apart from China, all of which were in one way or another under British or US control or influence. The remainder of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean was represented by proxy, i.e. by the colonial powers. It is easy to imagine how Third World delegates at Bretton Woods, despite some attempts to put development issues on the table, were overwhelmed by the weight of the big powers. Even more relevant in this respect is the fact that national liberation movements struggling to acquire political freedom were not yet fully conscious of the need for Third World solidarity, nor of the tough demands of development. Thus, it is by no means an exaggeration to state that the spirit of the Group of 77, born some 20 years later, was completely absent from Bretton Woods; indeed, the G.77, as such, only penetrated the IMF precincts in 1979. In the declared purposes of the IMF, no mention was made of the particular problems of Third World countries.”

Ismail-Sabri Abdalla (1980). The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the IMF (p. 37). [PDF] Development Dialogue.
↑ ^17.0 ^17.1 Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura (2020). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography: 'Structural Adjustment'. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10712-7 [HUB]
↑ Henry Veltmeyer (1993). Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative, vol. Vol. 28, No. 39. Economic and Political Weekly.
↑ ^19.0 ^19.1 “The third leg of U.S. policy has come to be known as the "invisible blockade" of loans and credits to Chile. For years historians have debated if such a blockade existed, or whether Allende's socialist economic policies led to a loss of economic credit. Recently declassified NSC records on Chile show conclusively that the Nixon Administration moved quickly to shut down multilateral and bilateral foreign aid to Chile—before Allende had completed a month in office. At the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the NSC simply informed the U.S. representative that he did not have authority to vote for loans to Chile. According to a SECRET/NODIS "Status Report on U.S. Stance on IDB Lending to Chile"—prepared for Dr. Kissinger several weeks after Allende's inauguration—"the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As ... an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans." At the World Bank, U.S. officials worked behind the scenes to assure that Chile would be disqualified for a pending $21 million livestock-improvement credit and future loans.”

Peter Kornbluh (2007-09-25). Declassifying U.S. Intervention in Chile The North American Congress on Latin America.
↑ “FYI, we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark. The plotters are keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Francophone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good.”

Robert W. Komer (1965-05-27). Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.
↑ “The U.S.A. and Britain could, if they had wanted, have fixed a reasonable price for cocoa and so have eased the economic situation in Ghana. They had no wish to do so. On the contrary, the forcing down of the price of cocoa was part of their policy of preparing the economic ground for political action in the form of a "coup" and a change of government.

Throughout 1965, and before then, the U.S. government exerted various other forms of economic pressure on Ghana.

It withheld investment and credit guarantees from potential investors, put pressure on existing providers of credit to the Ghanaian economy, and negated applications for loans made by Ghana to American-dominated financial institutions such as the l.M.F.

This pressure ended smartly after 24th February 1966 when the U.S. State Department's political objective had been achieved. The price of cocoa suddenly rose on the world market, and the I.M.F. rushed to the aid of the "N.L.C."

[...] it brought results in the shape of the usual handouts granted by imperialists and neo-colonialists to well-behaved puppets. Within two weeks of the ending of legal government in Ghana, the army and police traitors received an invitation to send a mission to Washington for talks with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank officials. The upshot was a £13 million stand-by credit received from the l.M.F. and eventually new loans from the U.S.A., Canada and West Germany. In addition, supplies of various foodstuffs and other consumer goods were promised to provide the necessary window dressing for the new regime.”

Kwame Nkrumah (1968). Dark Days in Ghana.
↑ “The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.

The point of this memo is that we ought to follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes. A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage.”

Robert W. Komer (1966-03-12). "260. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson" Office of the Historian, United Stated Department of State. Archived from the original on 2025-02-07.
↑ “The World Bank and the InterAmerican Bank, among others, refused to grant Chile credit during Allende’s experiments, and his social reform agenda had provoked the elite’s anger. For this reason, the Christian Democrats who spoke for that elite welcomed Pinochet’s coup. [...] That Allende had nationalized the U.S.-owned firms of American Anaconda Copper, ITT, and Kennecott led Nixon to authorize $10 million to “make the economy scream.” When Pinochet came to power, the United States did its utmost to repair all frayed relations between the transnational firms and the Chilean bureaucracy. The telecommunications giant ITT had demanded $95 million as compensation from Allende. The Pinochet junta gave them $235 million. In 1975, Chile welcomed the economist Milton Friedman, who advocated “shock treatment” and austerity to increase growth rates. The general’s coup of Pinochet restored the rule of the oligarchy and the transnational corporations, much to the satisfaction of the U.S. government.”

Vojay Prashad. The Darker Nations.
↑ “Businessmen from the U.S.A., from Britain, West Germany, Israel and elsewhere, flew into Ghana like vultures to grab the richest pickings. Virtually all the state-owned industries developed by my government were allowed to pass into private ownership. These included such enterprises as The Timber Products Corporation, The Cocoa Products Corporation, the Diamond Mining Corporation, the National Steel Works, the Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways, and all the stateowned hotels.”

Kwame Nkrumah (1968). Dark Days in Ghana.
↑ “Although the neo-liberal agenda for Latin America was formed in the context of the 1982 debt crisis, the orthodox programme of structural adjustment was pioneered in Chile by the military regime installed in 1973 with a right-wing political project to arrest and reverse the development process under way, and to demobilise the social and political forces which, with Salvador Allende, had captured the presidency and threatened the status quo of the propertied and political classes. The economic reforms designed by a team of technocrats, the 'Chicago Boys', and implemented by the regime between 1975 and 1981 were so deep and far-reaching that Ronald McKinnon, a World Bank economist and one of the architects of the Washington Consensus on appropriate policy, observed in a Central Bank memo [Santiago 1977] that "the Chilean government has made more sweeping rationalisations... than has occurred in any economy in modern history".”

Henry Veltmeyer (1993). Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative, vol. Vol. 28, No. 39. Economic and Political Weekly.
↑ “In September 1973, a US-backed coup d’état in Chile ousted the left-leaning Salvador Allende and replaced him with General Pinochet. Pinochet and his allies in the United States put in place an economic model that removed labor regulations and brutally suppressed dissent. The intellectual support came from a group of economists based in the University of Chicago and led by Milton Friedman. These “Chicago Boys” were the architects of the neoliberal policies in Chile, which acted as a test bed for ideas that would soon come to dominate policy.”

Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura (2020). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography: 'Structural Adjustment'. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10712-7 [HUB]
↑ “Gradually the IMF created procedures for accountability and punishment, generally as a poor report against the country that might lead to a dearth of commercial finance. States outside the G-7 that took IMF money had to submit to a total makeover of their political and economic relations. In March 1980, the World Bank would give these sorts of policies a name, “Structural Adjustment loan,” which would soon be called the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP).”

Vijay Prashad (2007). The Darker Nations.
↑ Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough.
↑ Jason Oringer and Carol Welch (1998-04-01). "Structural Adjustment Programs" Foreign Policy in Focus. Archived from the original on 2025-03-24.
↑ Fernanda Vallejos (2022-03-10). "Argentina Demands Justice From the IMF" The Intercept. Archived from the original on 2022-06-16. Retrieved 2022-06-19.
↑ Vijay Prashad (2008). The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World: 'Kingston' (pp. 229–34). [PDF] The New Press. ISBN 9781595583420 [LG]
↑ Prabhat Patnaik (2022-03-06). "The IMF Connection with the Ukraine Crisis" Peoples Democracy. Retrieved 2022-06-19.
↑ Michael Parenti (2000). To Kill a Nation: 'Third Worldization' (pp. 19–21). [PDF] Verso.
↑ Dian Maria Blandina (2022-06-29). "IMF Loans Continue to Undermine Health in Africa" Black Agenda Report. Archived from the original on 2022-06-30. Retrieved 2022-07-06.
↑ Brian Stauffer (2023-09-25). "Bandage on a Bullet Wound" Human Rights Watch. Archived from the original on 2023-10-06. Retrieved 2023-10-06.

[:0-1] 1.0 ^1.1 ^1.2 ^1.3 Arman Tendulkar (2021-10-11). "The International Monetary Fund: A Vehicle for Modern Day Imperialism" International Policy Digest. Retrieved 2022-06-19.

[:2-2] 2.0 ^2.1 “The under-representation of low- and middle-income countries on the BWIs’ Executive Boards is exacerbated by the historic ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the United States and European countries, which has seen the Fund and Bank led by a European and US national, respectively, since their inception. Civil society has long called for this opaque system to be replaced with a merit-based, transparent process. However, the April 2019 appointment of World Bank President David Malpass – a US national who ran unopposed for the Bank’s top job – demonstrated that the gentleman’s agreement remains alive and well despite civil society opposition”

"What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?" (2019-06-04). Bretton Woods Project. Archived from the original on 2025-01-29.

[:3-3] 3.0 ^3.1 "IMF Quotas". International Monetary Fund. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.

[:4-4] 4.0 ^4.1 “SDR: Special Drawing Right. An internal account and reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund in 1970. The value of SDR's varies proportionately with a basket of five national currencies (the US dollar, sterling, deutschmark, the french franc and the yen). [...] SDR's are distributed among the participating countries in proportion to their IMF quota. Under the SDR facility, member countries of the IMF may use their SDRs either bilaterally to buy back their own currency from another member country if that country is willing to sell, or through the Fund. Under a so-called Standby Arrangement, member governments may borrow more than their quota, provided they satisfy the Fund that they observe certain key policy indicators prescribed by the Fund. This is referred to as IMF Conditionality.”

Ankie Hoogvelt (1987). The crime of conditionality: Open letter to the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Review of African Political Economy. doi: 10.1080/03056248708703717 [HUB]

[:5-5] 5.0 ^5.1 “How Does the IMF Operate?” Bretton Woods Project. August 23, 2005.

[:1-6] 6.0 ^6.1 ^6.2 “What Are the Main Criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?” Bretton Woods Project. June 4, 2019. Archived 2022-09-18.

[7] “While historically the IMF and Bank enforced conditionality primarily through SAPs, today, the IMF requires a ‘letter of intent’ from governments requesting a loan. To be approved by the IMF for a loan, the letter requires prior actions, quantitative performance criteria and structural benchmarks – the latter of which continues to contain structural macroeconomic policy reforms. Despite efforts to ‘streamline’ the number of conditions in the face of severe criticism, the IMF’s 2018 Review of Program Design and Conditionality found that the number of structural conditions is on the rise.”

"What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?" (2019-06-04). Bretton Woods Project. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.

[:6-8] 8.0 ^8.1 “Our policy package for Trinidad and Tobago - i.e. the conditionality that we are demanding for any Fund program, and the measures that we are asking the authorities to implement as a necessary precondition for a loosening of the iron grip that we now hold on the fortunes of the country in so far as its recourse to international capital markets and official bilateral donors are concerned - can be shown, even in a half-objective analysis, to be self-defeating and unworkable. That policy package can never serve, under any set of circumstances, the cause of financial balance and economic growth. Rather, what, in effect, we are asking the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to do is to self-destruct itself and unleash unstoppable economic and social chaos.”

Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough: 'Part I'.

[9] “Quite frankly, our "program" is nothing but a hotchpotch of irreconcilable and conflicting elements and objectives; it reduces economics to a farce. It is the recipe for comprehensive disorder and all enfolding disintegration of the fabric of national life - economic, political, social - without reason or rationale or sensitivity to the aftermath. More pointedly, our action in Trinidad and Tobago does not relate to any clear set of economic principles - however misguided and inappropriate such principles may be. We're just striking out wildly in every direction and at everything in our path; we strike out thus and we create maximum grief and confusion. It's like a terrorist attack, you know, splashing around rifle fire and bazookas and even nerve gas indiscriminately so as to get the highest death toll in the shortest possible time.”

Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough: 'Part IV'.

[10] “Self-defeating and unethical as it may seem, what we have done and are doing in Trinidad and Tobago is being repeated in scores of countries around the world, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. Sometimes we operate with greater restraint, sometimes with less, but the process and the result are always the same: a standard, pompous recital of doctrinaire Fund "advice" given uncompromisingly and often contemptuously and in utter disregard to local conditions and concerns and susceptibilities. It is the norm now rather than the exception, that when our "one-for-all and all-for-one" Fund cap doesn't fit the head for which it is intended, we cut and shave and mangle the head so as to give the semblance of a fit. Maybe we bust up the head too much in Trinidad and Tobago, but have no illusions that the way We operate throughout the world - the narrow and irrelevant epistemology underlying our work, the airs and affectations and biases and illusions of superiority of our staff vis-Á-vis government officials and politicians in the developing world, our outrageous salaries and perks and diplomatic immunities and multiple "entitlements", the ill-gotten, inadvertent power that we revel in wielding over prostrate governments and peoples - can only serve to accentuate world tensions, expand even further the already bulging ranks of the poverty-striken and destitute of the South, and stunt, worldwide, the human soul, and the human capacity for caring and upholding norms of justice and fairplay.”

Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough: 'Part I'.

[11] “While maintaining they have no obligations under international human rights law, despite objections of myriad human rights experts and the opinion of one of the Bank’s former General Counsels, both the Bank and Fund claim their work to eradicate poverty and increase economic growth and stability ultimately contributes to global welfare and the fulfilment of human rights, without clear evidence. First, this ‘win-win’ scenario has been the subject of countless critiques pointing to obvious trade-offs and conflicts between ‘pro-growth’ and ‘pro-equity’ policies, including in a paper by the IMF’s own research department in 2014.

Second, according to data on poverty rates, the vast majority of the poverty eradication achieved during the last 40 years is actually largely attributed to China, which has certainly not followed the policy prescriptions of the BWIs (see Observer Winter 2017-2018), while the IMF’s 2018 conditionality review found several IMF programmes where “debt overshot projections by significant margins, reflecting disappointing growth and higher fiscal deficits”, with lower programme completion rates. Additionally, the pace of poverty reduction is reportedly slowing, while the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa is increasing, and even the way the Bank measures poverty levels remains highly disputed. These and other critiques call into question the efficacy of the BWIs’ policy prescriptions more generally and their theoretical ability to effectively contribute to the fulfilment of human rights in the first place.”

"What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?" (2019-06-04). Bretton Woods Project. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.

[12] Kurt Schuler and Mark Bernkopf (2014). Who was at Bretton Woods?. [PDF] New York: Center for Financial Stability.

[:7-13] 13.0 ^13.1 ^13.2 ^13.3 Ismail-Sabri Abdalla (1980). The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the IMF. [PDF] Development Dialogue.

[14] Muchkund Dubey (2014-05-16). "The Historic Importance of G-77" UN Chronicle.

[15] "About the Group of 77". The Group of 77 at the United Nations.

[16] “The major Third World presence was that of the Latin American countries (which were all there except Argentina). Africa and Asia were represented by only seven countries apart from China, all of which were in one way or another under British or US control or influence. The remainder of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean was represented by proxy, i.e. by the colonial powers. It is easy to imagine how Third World delegates at Bretton Woods, despite some attempts to put development issues on the table, were overwhelmed by the weight of the big powers. Even more relevant in this respect is the fact that national liberation movements struggling to acquire political freedom were not yet fully conscious of the need for Third World solidarity, nor of the tough demands of development. Thus, it is by no means an exaggeration to state that the spirit of the Group of 77, born some 20 years later, was completely absent from Bretton Woods; indeed, the G.77, as such, only penetrated the IMF precincts in 1979. In the declared purposes of the IMF, no mention was made of the particular problems of Third World countries.”

Ismail-Sabri Abdalla (1980). The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the IMF (p. 37). [PDF] Development Dialogue.

[:8-17] 17.0 ^17.1 Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura (2020). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography: 'Structural Adjustment'. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10712-7 [HUB]

[18] Henry Veltmeyer (1993). Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative, vol. Vol. 28, No. 39. Economic and Political Weekly.

[:9-19] 19.0 ^19.1 “The third leg of U.S. policy has come to be known as the "invisible blockade" of loans and credits to Chile. For years historians have debated if such a blockade existed, or whether Allende's socialist economic policies led to a loss of economic credit. Recently declassified NSC records on Chile show conclusively that the Nixon Administration moved quickly to shut down multilateral and bilateral foreign aid to Chile—before Allende had completed a month in office. At the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the NSC simply informed the U.S. representative that he did not have authority to vote for loans to Chile. According to a SECRET/NODIS "Status Report on U.S. Stance on IDB Lending to Chile"—prepared for Dr. Kissinger several weeks after Allende's inauguration—"the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As ... an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans." At the World Bank, U.S. officials worked behind the scenes to assure that Chile would be disqualified for a pending $21 million livestock-improvement credit and future loans.”

Peter Kornbluh (2007-09-25). Declassifying U.S. Intervention in Chile The North American Congress on Latin America.

[20] “FYI, we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark. The plotters are keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Francophone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good.”

Robert W. Komer (1965-05-27). Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Office of the Historian, United States Department of State. Archived from the original on 2025-03-15.

[21] “The U.S.A. and Britain could, if they had wanted, have fixed a reasonable price for cocoa and so have eased the economic situation in Ghana. They had no wish to do so. On the contrary, the forcing down of the price of cocoa was part of their policy of preparing the economic ground for political action in the form of a "coup" and a change of government.

Throughout 1965, and before then, the U.S. government exerted various other forms of economic pressure on Ghana.

It withheld investment and credit guarantees from potential investors, put pressure on existing providers of credit to the Ghanaian economy, and negated applications for loans made by Ghana to American-dominated financial institutions such as the l.M.F.

This pressure ended smartly after 24th February 1966 when the U.S. State Department's political objective had been achieved. The price of cocoa suddenly rose on the world market, and the I.M.F. rushed to the aid of the "N.L.C."

[...] it brought results in the shape of the usual handouts granted by imperialists and neo-colonialists to well-behaved puppets. Within two weeks of the ending of legal government in Ghana, the army and police traitors received an invitation to send a mission to Washington for talks with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank officials. The upshot was a £13 million stand-by credit received from the l.M.F. and eventually new loans from the U.S.A., Canada and West Germany. In addition, supplies of various foodstuffs and other consumer goods were promised to provide the necessary window dressing for the new regime.”

Kwame Nkrumah (1968). Dark Days in Ghana.

[22] “The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.

The point of this memo is that we ought to follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes. A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage.”

Robert W. Komer (1966-03-12). "260. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson" Office of the Historian, United Stated Department of State. Archived from the original on 2025-02-07.

[23] “The World Bank and the InterAmerican Bank, among others, refused to grant Chile credit during Allende’s experiments, and his social reform agenda had provoked the elite’s anger. For this reason, the Christian Democrats who spoke for that elite welcomed Pinochet’s coup. [...] That Allende had nationalized the U.S.-owned firms of American Anaconda Copper, ITT, and Kennecott led Nixon to authorize $10 million to “make the economy scream.” When Pinochet came to power, the United States did its utmost to repair all frayed relations between the transnational firms and the Chilean bureaucracy. The telecommunications giant ITT had demanded $95 million as compensation from Allende. The Pinochet junta gave them $235 million. In 1975, Chile welcomed the economist Milton Friedman, who advocated “shock treatment” and austerity to increase growth rates. The general’s coup of Pinochet restored the rule of the oligarchy and the transnational corporations, much to the satisfaction of the U.S. government.”

Vojay Prashad. The Darker Nations.

[24] “Businessmen from the U.S.A., from Britain, West Germany, Israel and elsewhere, flew into Ghana like vultures to grab the richest pickings. Virtually all the state-owned industries developed by my government were allowed to pass into private ownership. These included such enterprises as The Timber Products Corporation, The Cocoa Products Corporation, the Diamond Mining Corporation, the National Steel Works, the Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways, and all the stateowned hotels.”

Kwame Nkrumah (1968). Dark Days in Ghana.

[25] “Although the neo-liberal agenda for Latin America was formed in the context of the 1982 debt crisis, the orthodox programme of structural adjustment was pioneered in Chile by the military regime installed in 1973 with a right-wing political project to arrest and reverse the development process under way, and to demobilise the social and political forces which, with Salvador Allende, had captured the presidency and threatened the status quo of the propertied and political classes. The economic reforms designed by a team of technocrats, the 'Chicago Boys', and implemented by the regime between 1975 and 1981 were so deep and far-reaching that Ronald McKinnon, a World Bank economist and one of the architects of the Washington Consensus on appropriate policy, observed in a Central Bank memo [Santiago 1977] that "the Chilean government has made more sweeping rationalisations... than has occurred in any economy in modern history".”

Henry Veltmeyer (1993). Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative, vol. Vol. 28, No. 39. Economic and Political Weekly.

[26] “In September 1973, a US-backed coup d’état in Chile ousted the left-leaning Salvador Allende and replaced him with General Pinochet. Pinochet and his allies in the United States put in place an economic model that removed labor regulations and brutally suppressed dissent. The intellectual support came from a group of economists based in the University of Chicago and led by Milton Friedman. These “Chicago Boys” were the architects of the neoliberal policies in Chile, which acted as a test bed for ideas that would soon come to dominate policy.”

Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura (2020). International Encyclopedia of Human Geography: 'Structural Adjustment'. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10712-7 [HUB]

[27] “Gradually the IMF created procedures for accountability and punishment, generally as a poor report against the country that might lead to a dearth of commercial finance. States outside the G-7 that took IMF money had to submit to a total makeover of their political and economic relations. In March 1980, the World Bank would give these sorts of policies a name, “Structural Adjustment loan,” which would soon be called the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP).”

Vijay Prashad (2007). The Darker Nations.

[28] Davison L. Budhoo (1988). Enough is Enough.

[29] Jason Oringer and Carol Welch (1998-04-01). "Structural Adjustment Programs" Foreign Policy in Focus. Archived from the original on 2025-03-24.

[30] Fernanda Vallejos (2022-03-10). "Argentina Demands Justice From the IMF" The Intercept. Archived from the original on 2022-06-16. Retrieved 2022-06-19.

[:1222-31] Vijay Prashad (2008). The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World: 'Kingston' (pp. 229–34). [PDF] The New Press. ISBN 9781595583420 [LG]

[32] Prabhat Patnaik (2022-03-06). "The IMF Connection with the Ukraine Crisis" Peoples Democracy. Retrieved 2022-06-19.

[33] Michael Parenti (2000). To Kill a Nation: 'Third Worldization' (pp. 19–21). [PDF] Verso.

[34] Dian Maria Blandina (2022-06-29). "IMF Loans Continue to Undermine Health in Africa" Black Agenda Report. Archived from the original on 2022-06-30. Retrieved 2022-07-06.

[35] Brian Stauffer (2023-09-25). "Bandage on a Bullet Wound" Human Rights Watch. Archived from the original on 2023-10-06. Retrieved 2023-10-06.

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

[35]

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
 {{Infobox company|name=International Monetary Fund|image=IMF logo.png|caption=Logo|founding_date=27 December 1945|headquarters=[[Washington, D.C.]], [[United States of America|United Sttaes]]}}
-The '''International Monetary Fund''' ('''IMF''') is a [[Neoliberalism|neoliberal]] financial organization. Although it is a global organization, 38% of it is controlled by [[French Republic|France]], [[Federal Republic of Germany|Germany]], [[Japan]], the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|United Kingdom]], and [[United States of America|United States]].<ref name=":0">{{News citation|author=Arman Tendulkar|newspaper=International Policy Digest|title=The International Monetary Fund: A Vehicle for Modern Day Imperialism|date=2021-10-11|url=https://intpolicydigest.org/the-platform/the-international-monetary-fund-a-vehicle-for-modern-day-imperialism/|retrieved=2022-06-19}}</ref> The IMF and its fellow Bretton-Woods institution, the [[The World Bank|World Bank]], have been led by a [[Europe|European]] and a US national since their inception, in what has been described as a "gentleman's agreement"<ref name=":2">{{Web citation|newspaper=Bretton Woods Project|title=What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?|date=2019-06-04|url=https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250129062158/https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-date=2025-01-29|quote=The under-representation of low- and middle-income countries on the BWIs’ Executive Boards is exacerbated by the historic ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the United States and European countries, which has seen the Fund and Bank led by a European and US national, respectively, since their inception. Civil society has long called for this opaque system to be replaced with a merit-based, transparent process. However, the April 2019 appointment of World Bank President David Malpass – a US national who ran unopposed for the Bank’s top job – demonstrated that the gentleman’s agreement remains alive and well despite civil society opposition}}</ref> despite demands for a merit-based, transparent process to be instated.<ref name=":2" />
+The '''International Monetary Fund''' ('''IMF''') is a [[Neoliberalism|neoliberal]] financial organization. Although it is a global organization, 38% of it is controlled by [[French Republic|France]], [[Federal Republic of Germany|Germany]], [[Japan]], the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland|United Kingdom]], and [[United States of America|United States]].<ref name=":0">{{News citation|author=Arman Tendulkar|newspaper=International Policy Digest|title=The International Monetary Fund: A Vehicle for Modern Day Imperialism|date=2021-10-11|url=https://intpolicydigest.org/the-platform/the-international-monetary-fund-a-vehicle-for-modern-day-imperialism/|retrieved=2022-06-19}}</ref> The IMF and its fellow [[Bretton Woods institutions|Bretton Woods institution]], the [[The World Bank|World Bank]], have been led by a [[Europe|European]] and a US national since their inception, in what has been described as a "gentleman's agreement"<ref name=":2">{{Web citation|newspaper=Bretton Woods Project|title=What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?|date=2019-06-04|url=https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250129062158/https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-date=2025-01-29|quote=The under-representation of low- and middle-income countries on the BWIs’ Executive Boards is exacerbated by the historic ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between the United States and European countries, which has seen the Fund and Bank led by a European and US national, respectively, since their inception. Civil society has long called for this opaque system to be replaced with a merit-based, transparent process. However, the April 2019 appointment of World Bank President David Malpass – a US national who ran unopposed for the Bank’s top job – demonstrated that the gentleman’s agreement remains alive and well despite civil society opposition}}</ref> despite demands for a merit-based, transparent process to be instated.<ref name=":2" />
 Upon membership in the IMF, member countries deposit a sum of money known as a quota subscription, denominated in [[special drawing rights]] (SDR),<ref name=":3">{{Web citation|newspaper=International Monetary Fund|title=IMF Quotas|url=https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2022/IMF-Quotas|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250315031532/https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2022/IMF-Quotas|archive-date=2025-03-15}}</ref><ref name=":4">{{Citation|author=Ankie Hoogvelt|year=1987|title=The crime of conditionality: Open letter to the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)|quote=SDR: Special Drawing Right. An internal account and reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund in 1970. The value of SDR's varies proportionately with a basket of five national currencies (the US dollar, sterling, deutschmark, the french franc and the yen). [...] SDR's are distributed among the participating countries in proportion to their IMF quota. Under the SDR facility, member countries of the IMF may use their SDRs either bilaterally to buy back their own currency from another member country if that country is willing to sell, or through the Fund. Under a so-called Standby Arrangement, member governments may borrow more than their quota, provided they satisfy the Fund that they observe certain key policy indicators prescribed by the Fund. This is referred to as IMF Conditionality.|publisher=Review of African Political Economy|doi=10.1080/03056248708703717}}</ref> which determines how much money they can draw from the IMF, with the sum also determining the voting power of the member country.<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":3" /> In return for financial assistance from the <abbr>IMF</abbr>, borrower countries must implement a set of economic reforms, typically referred to as [[Structural adjustment|structural adjustment programs]] (SAPs).<ref name=":5">[https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2005/08/art-320867/ “How Does the IMF Operate?”] Bretton Woods Project. August 23, 2005. </ref> The reforms stipulated by the IMF typically impose [[austerity]] measures, increase [[privatization]], and weaken social services.<ref name=":1">[https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/ “What Are the Main Criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?”] Bretton Woods Project. June 4, 2019. [https://web.archive.org/web/20220918164032/https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/ Archived] 2022-09-18.</ref> The requirement to implement SAPs in order to receive loan installments is referred to as conditionality.<ref name=":4" /> Historically, conditionality was enforced primarily through compliance with SAPs. However, the IMF also began requiring a "letter of intent" to be submitted by governments requesting IMF loans, with prior actions, quantitative performance criteria, and structural benchmarks to be approved for a loan.<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=Bretton Woods Project|title=What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?|date=2019-06-04|url=https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250315030715/https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-date=2025-03-15|quote=While historically the IMF and Bank enforced conditionality primarily through SAPs, today, the IMF requires a ‘letter of intent’ from governments requesting a loan. To be approved by the IMF for a loan, the letter requires prior actions, quantitative performance criteria and structural benchmarks – the latter of which continues to contain structural macroeconomic policy reforms. Despite efforts to ‘streamline’ the number of conditions in the face of severe criticism, the IMF’s 2018 Review of Program Design and Conditionality found that the number of structural conditions is on the rise.}}</ref>
@@ Line 7: / Line 7: @@
 In his [[Library:Enough is Enough|100-page resignation letter]] from the IMF, former IMF senior economist [[Davison L. Budhoo|Davison Budhoo]] described the extensive and systematic statistical fraud used by the IMF to impose its policies on developing countries, and explained that the consequences of these policies led to massive poverty and starvation. In the letter, Budhoo wrote that the IMF's policies are made in "utter disregard to local conditions" and lead countries to "self destruct" and "unleash unstoppable economic and social chaos"<ref name=":6">{{Citation|author=Davison L. Budhoo|year=1988|title=Enough is Enough|chapter=Part I|quote=Our policy package for Trinidad and Tobago - i.e. the conditionality that we are demanding for any Fund program, and the measures that we are asking the authorities to implement as a necessary precondition for a loosening of the iron grip that we now hold on the fortunes of the country in so far as its recourse to international capital markets and official bilateral donors are concerned - can be shown, even in a half-objective analysis, to be self-defeating and unworkable. That policy package can never serve, under any set of circumstances, the cause of financial balance and economic growth. Rather, what, in effect, we are asking the Government of Trinidad and Tobago to do is to self-destruct itself and unleash unstoppable economic and social chaos.}}</ref> and also compared the IMF's structural adjustment policies to a "terrorist attack".<ref>{{Citation|author=Davison L. Budhoo|year=1988|title=Enough is Enough|chapter=Part IV|quote=Quite frankly, our "program" is nothing but a hotchpotch of irreconcilable and conflicting elements and objectives; it reduces economics to a farce. It is the recipe for comprehensive disorder and all enfolding disintegration of the fabric of national life - economic, political, social - without reason or rationale or sensitivity to the aftermath. More pointedly, our action in Trinidad and Tobago does not relate to any clear set of economic principles - however misguided and inappropriate such principles may be. We're just striking out wildly in every direction and at everything in our path; we strike out thus and we create maximum grief and confusion. It's like a terrorist attack, you know, splashing around rifle fire and bazookas and even nerve gas indiscriminately so as to get the highest death toll in the shortest possible time.}}</ref> He also stated that the routine policy packages of the IMF "can never serve, under any set of circumstances, the cause of financial balance and economic growth"<ref name=":6" /> and that "the ill-gotten, inadvertent power that we revel in wielding over prostrate governments and peoples - can only serve to accentuate world tensions".<ref>{{Citation|author=Davison L. Budhoo|year=1988|title=Enough is Enough|chapter=Part I|quote=Self-defeating and unethical as it may seem, what we have done and are doing in Trinidad and Tobago is being repeated in scores of countries around the world, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa. Sometimes we operate with greater restraint, sometimes with less, but the process and the result are always the same: a standard, pompous recital of doctrinaire Fund "advice" given uncompromisingly and often contemptuously and in utter disregard to local conditions and concerns and susceptibilities. It is the norm now rather than the exception, that when our "one-for-all and all-for-one" Fund cap doesn't fit the head for which it is intended, we cut and shave and mangle the head so as to give the semblance of a fit. Maybe we bust up the head too much in Trinidad and Tobago, but have no illusions that the way We operate throughout the world - the narrow and irrelevant epistemology underlying our work, the airs and affectations and biases and illusions of superiority of our staff vis-Á-vis government officials and politicians in the developing world, our outrageous salaries and perks and diplomatic immunities and multiple "entitlements", the ill-gotten, inadvertent power that we revel in wielding over prostrate governments and peoples - can only serve to accentuate world tensions, expand even further the already bulging ranks of the poverty-striken and destitute of the South, and stunt, worldwide, the human soul, and the human capacity for caring and upholding norms of justice and fairplay.}}</ref>
-It has been noted by the [[Bretton Woods Project]], a civil society organization critical of the IMF and World Bank, that the IMF and World Bank's ability to position their policy prescriptions as "best practice" supported by "robust" theoretical and empirical work oftentimes results in the internalization of Bank and Fund positions by scholars, development practitioners and finance ministers. Furthermore BWP notes that though the IMF and World Bank claim that their work contributes to global welfare and the fulfillment of human rights, these institutions "lack clear evidence" for their claims and have faced objections by a myriad human rights experts.<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=Bretton Woods Project|title=What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?|date=2019-06-04|url=https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250315030715/https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-date=2025-03-15|quote=While maintaining they have no obligations under international human rights law, despite objections of myriad human rights experts and the opinion of one of the Bank’s former General Counsels, both the Bank and Fund claim their work to eradicate poverty and increase economic growth and stability ultimately contributes to global welfare and the fulfilment of human rights, without clear evidence. First, this ‘win-win’ scenario has been the subject of countless critiques pointing to obvious trade-offs and conflicts between ‘pro-growth’ and ‘pro-equity’ policies, including in a paper by the IMF’s own research department in 2014.
+It has been noted by the [[Bretton Woods Project]] (BWP), a civil society organization critical of the IMF and World Bank, that the IMF and World Bank's ability to position their policy prescriptions as "best practice" supported by "robust" theoretical and empirical work oftentimes results in the internalization of Bank and Fund positions by scholars, development practitioners and finance ministers. Furthermore BWP notes that though the IMF and World Bank claim that their work contributes to global welfare and the fulfillment of human rights, these institutions "lack clear evidence" for their claims and have faced objections by a myriad human rights experts.<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=Bretton Woods Project|title=What are the main criticisms of the World Bank and the IMF?|date=2019-06-04|url=https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250315030715/https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2019/06/what-are-the-main-criticisms-of-the-world-bank-and-the-imf/|archive-date=2025-03-15|quote=While maintaining they have no obligations under international human rights law, despite objections of myriad human rights experts and the opinion of one of the Bank’s former General Counsels, both the Bank and Fund claim their work to eradicate poverty and increase economic growth and stability ultimately contributes to global welfare and the fulfilment of human rights, without clear evidence. First, this ‘win-win’ scenario has been the subject of countless critiques pointing to obvious trade-offs and conflicts between ‘pro-growth’ and ‘pro-equity’ policies, including in a paper by the IMF’s own research department in 2014.
 Second, according to data on poverty rates, the vast majority of the poverty eradication achieved during the last 40 years is actually largely attributed to China, which has certainly not followed the policy prescriptions of the BWIs (see Observer Winter 2017-2018), while the IMF’s 2018 conditionality review found several IMF programmes where “debt overshot projections by significant margins, reflecting disappointing growth and higher fiscal deficits”, with lower programme completion rates. Additionally, the pace of poverty reduction is reportedly slowing, while the number of people living in extreme poverty in Africa is increasing, and even the way the Bank measures poverty levels remains highly disputed. These and other critiques call into question the efficacy of the BWIs’ policy prescriptions more generally and their theoretical ability to effectively contribute to the fulfilment of human rights in the first place.}}</ref>
 == History ==
-The [[Bretton Woods Institutions]] (BWIs) are the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). They were set up at a meeting of 43 countries in Bretton Woods, [[New Hampshire]], USA in July 1944. The idea behind them was ostensibly to help rebuild the economy after the [[Second World War]] and to promote international economic cooperation. They were based on the ideas of US Treasury Secretary [[Henry Morganthau]], his chief economic advisor [[Harry Dexter White]], and British economist [[John Maynard Keynes]]. The key decisions leading to the establishment of both institutions were largely steered by the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, and during the post-war period the BWIs were significantly influenced by the US’s geopolitical strength.<ref name=":1" />
+The IMF and World Bank, also known as the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs), were set up at a meeting of 44 country delegations in Bretton Woods, [[New Hampshire]], USA in July 1944.<ref>{{Citation|author=Kurt Schuler and Mark Bernkopf|year=2014|title=Who was at Bretton Woods?|pdf=https://centerforfinancialstability.org/bw/Who_Was_at_Bretton_Woods.pdf|city=New York|publisher=Center for Financial Stability}}</ref> The idea behind this conference was ostensibly to help rebuild the international economic system after the [[Second World War]] and to promote international economic cooperation. They were based on the ideas of US Treasury Secretary [[Henry Morganthau]], his chief economic advisor [[Harry Dexter White]], and British economist [[John Maynard Keynes]]. While the establishment of these institutions was presented as a supposedly apolitical effort, they served as a method to defend or expand the reach of western capitalism in the face of a potential challenge from the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]], and to promote US interests in particular.<ref name=":1" /> The Soviet Union was present at the conference but chose not to join the IMF.<ref name=":7">{{Citation|author=Ismail-Sabri Abdalla|year=1980|title=The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the IMF|pdf=https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/development-dialogue-1980-2.pdf|publisher=Development Dialogue}}</ref><sup>:37</sup>
+In its early years, the IMF established a training institute which was attended by central bank officials from the [[Global North and South|global South]].<ref name=":7" /><sup>:41</sup>
+Economist [[Ismail Sabri Abdalla]] has summarized that the Bretton Woods conference was "essentially a conference about the monetary and financial problems of the industrialized [[capitalist]] countries" and that the IMF was not conceived to deal with the specific financial problems of [[Three-world model|Third World]] countries. Abdallah states that "[t]he choice made at Bretton Woods was, in the final analysis, the expression of power relations between the USA and its allies; it contributed greatly to the consolidation of US hegemony and a dominance—dependence relationship between the USA and the other countries which joined the IMF system." He explains that because the US dollar was held outside of the US as an international means of payment and reserve asset, the US was in a position to increase its money supply without giving rise to significant inflationary pressures at home, unlike other nations which could only deal with inflation for short periods before imposing deflationary measures.<ref name=":7" /><sup>:37-41</sup>
+In 1964, the [[Group of 77]] (G77) emerged at the end of the first [[United Nations Conference on Trade and Development]] (UNCTAD).<ref>{{Web citation|author=Muchkund Dubey|newspaper=UN Chronicle|title=The Historic Importance of G-77|date=2014-05-16|url=https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/historic-importance-g-77}}</ref> The G77's aims were intended to enable global South countries to articulate and promote their collective economic interests, enhance their joint negotiating capacity, and promote [[South-South cooperation]]<ref>{{Web citation|newspaper=The Group of 77 at the United Nations|title=About the Group of 77|url=https://www.g77.org/doc/}}</ref>—considerations which had been effectively unaddressed at the Bretton Woods conference twenty years prior, when many of the concerned countries were still under colonial rule.<ref>{{Citation|author=Ismail-Sabri Abdalla|year=1980|title=The Inadequacy and Loss of Legitimacy of the IMF|page=37|quote=The major Third World presence was that of the Latin American countries (which were all there except Argentina). Africa and Asia were represented by only seven countries apart from China, all of which were in one way or another under British or US control or influence. The remainder of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean was represented by proxy, i.e. by the colonial powers. It is easy to imagine how Third World delegates at Bretton Woods, despite some attempts to put development issues on the table, were overwhelmed by the weight of the big powers. Even more relevant in this respect is the fact that national liberation movements struggling to acquire political freedom were not yet fully conscious of the need for Third World solidarity, nor of the tough demands of development. Thus, it is by no means an exaggeration to state that the spirit of the Group of 77, born some 20 years later, was completely absent from Bretton Woods; indeed, the G.77, as such, only penetrated the IMF precincts in 1979. In the declared purposes of the IMF, no mention was made of the particular problems of Third World countries.|pdf=https://www.daghammarskjold.se/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/development-dialogue-1980-2.pdf|publisher=Development Dialogue}}</ref>
+The IMF's scheme of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) was established in 1969. As distribution of SDRs was based on quotas, the majority went to the industrialized countries, with Third World countries receiving about 25% of the first issue.<ref name=":7" /><sup>:43-45</sup>
+From the Second World War until the 1970s, [[Keynesianism]] held influence in bourgeois economic thinking. Keynesianism regarded the state as having a legitimate role in managing certain aspects of a capitalist economy. Also during that period, international economic regulation was enacted through the system of the [[gold standard]]. However, various events in the 1970s would come to influence significant changes in economic policy in the imperial core and the development of neoliberalism, which would emphasize the minimization of the state's influence in the economy. Additionally, the US would abandon the gold standard in 1971.<ref name=":8">{{Citation|author=Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura|year=2020|title=International Encyclopedia of Human Geography|chapter=Structural Adjustment|doi=10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10712-7}}</ref>
+The turn toward neoliberal policies in the 1980s may be contrasted with earlier approaches, in which state intervention in maintaining economic stability and development was a norm, employing concepts such as [[import substitution industrialization]] (ISI) and the use of [[State-owned enterprise|state-owned enterprises]] (SOEs).<ref>{{Citation|author=Henry Veltmeyer|year=1993|title=Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative|title-url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/4400203|publisher=Economic and Political Weekly|volume=Vol. 28, No. 39}}</ref> While such practices are sometimes described as having failed or are blamed for poor economic performance in the global South, it may be noted that imperialist-led institutions have been described as having instituted a financial "invisible blockade"<ref name=":9">{{Web citation|author=Peter Kornbluh|newspaper=The North American Congress on Latin America|title=Declassifying U.S. Intervention in Chile|date=2007-09-25|quote=The third leg of U.S. policy has come to be known as the "invisible blockade" of loans and credits to Chile. For years historians have debated if such a blockade existed, or whether Allende's socialist economic policies led to a loss of economic credit. Recently declassified NSC records on Chile show conclusively that the Nixon Administration moved quickly to shut down multilateral and bilateral foreign aid to Chile—before Allende had completed a month in office. At the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the NSC simply informed the U.S. representative that he did not have authority to vote for loans to Chile. According to a SECRET/NODIS "Status Report on U.S. Stance on IDB Lending to Chile"—prepared for Dr. Kissinger several weeks after Allende's inauguration—"the U.S. Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank understands that he will remain uninstructed until further notice on pending loans to Chile. As ... an affirmative vote by the U.S. is required for loan approval, this will effectively bar approval of the loans." At the World Bank, U.S. officials worked behind the scenes to assure that Chile would be disqualified for a pending $21 million livestock-improvement credit and future loans.}}</ref> against countries which pursued socialist or resource nationalist development strategies, using such tactics to purposely foment coups d'etat against leaders like [[Kwame Nkrumah]] in [[Ghana]] (in 1966)<ref>{{Web citation|author=Robert W. Komer|newspaper=Office of the Historian, United States Department of State|title=Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)|date=1965-05-27|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250315055832/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d253|archive-date=2025-03-15|quote=FYI, we may have a pro-Western coup in Ghana soon. Certain key military and police figures have been planning one for some time, and Ghana’s deteriorating economic condition may provide the spark. The plotters are keeping us briefed, and State thinks we’re more on the inside than the British. While we’re not directly involved (I’m told), we and other Western countries (including France) have been helping to set up the situation by ignoring Nkrumah’s pleas for economic aid. The new OCAM (Francophone) group’s refusal to attend any OAU meeting in Accra (because of Nkrumah’s plotting) will further isolate him. All in all, looks good.}}</ref> and [[Salvador Allende]] in [[Chile]] (in 1973),<ref name=":9" /> after which right-wing, pro-West governments would be installed and IMF approvals and access to monetary aid and other benefits would open up,<ref>{{Citation|author=Kwame Nkrumah|year=1968|title=Dark Days in Ghana|quote=The U.S.A. and Britain could, if they had wanted, have fixed a reasonable price for cocoa and so have eased the economic situation in Ghana. They had no wish to do so. On the contrary, the forcing down of the price of cocoa was part of their policy of preparing the economic ground for political action in the form of a "coup" and a change of government.
+Throughout 1965, and before then, the U.S. government exerted various other forms of economic pressure on Ghana.
+It withheld investment and credit guarantees from potential investors, put pressure on existing providers of credit to the Ghanaian economy, and negated applications for loans made by Ghana to American-dominated financial institutions such as the l.M.F.
+This pressure ended smartly after 24th February 1966 when the U.S. State Department's political objective had been achieved. The price of cocoa suddenly rose on the world market, and the I.M.F. rushed to the aid of the "N.L.C."
+[...] it brought results in the shape of the usual handouts granted by imperialists and neo-colonialists to well-behaved puppets. Within two weeks of the ending of legal government in Ghana, the army and police traitors received an invitation to send a mission to Washington for talks with the International Monetary Fund and World Bank officials. The upshot was a £13 million stand-by credit received from the l.M.F. and eventually new loans from the U.S.A., Canada and West Germany. In addition, supplies of various foodstuffs and other consumer goods were promised to provide the necessary window dressing for the new regime.}}</ref><ref>{{Web citation|author=Robert W. Komer|newspaper=Office of the Historian, United Stated Department of State|title=260. Memorandum From the President’s Acting Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson|date=1966-03-12|url=https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d260|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250207021648/https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d260|archive-date=2025-02-07|quote=The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.
+The point of this memo is that we ought to follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes. A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage.}}</ref> while the process of privatizations of state enterprises and selling off of national resources began.<ref>{{Citation|author=Vojay Prashad|title=The Darker Nations|quote=The World Bank and the InterAmerican Bank, among others, refused to grant Chile credit during Allende’s experiments, and his social reform agenda had provoked the elite’s anger. For this reason, the Christian Democrats who spoke for that elite welcomed Pinochet’s coup. [...] That Allende had nationalized the U.S.-owned firms of American Anaconda Copper, ITT, and Kennecott led Nixon to authorize $10 million to “make the economy scream.” When Pinochet came to power, the United States did its utmost to repair all frayed relations between the transnational firms and the Chilean bureaucracy. The telecommunications giant ITT had demanded $95 million as compensation from Allende. The Pinochet junta gave them $235 million. In 1975, Chile welcomed the economist Milton Friedman, who advocated “shock treatment” and austerity to increase growth rates. The general’s coup of Pinochet restored the rule of the oligarchy and the transnational corporations, much to the satisfaction of the U.S. government.}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|author=Kwame Nkrumah|year=1968|title=Dark Days in Ghana|quote=Businessmen from the U.S.A., from Britain, West Germany, Israel and elsewhere, flew into Ghana like vultures to grab the richest pickings. Virtually all the state-owned industries developed by my government were allowed to pass into private ownership. These included such enterprises as The Timber Products Corporation, The Cocoa Products Corporation, the Diamond Mining Corporation, the National Steel Works, the Black Star Shipping Line, Ghana Airways, and all the stateowned hotels.}}</ref> The 1973 coup in Chile and the subsequent implementation of the economic prescriptions of the "[[Chicago school]]" of [[Milton Friedman]] is often regarded as an important element in the development of what would come to be called neoliberalism, and come to dominate policy at the IMF and related institutions.<ref>{{Citation|author=Henry Veltmeyer|year=1993|title=Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment in Latin America: In Search of an Alternative|quote=Although the neo-liberal agenda for Latin America was formed in the context of the 1982 debt crisis, the orthodox programme of structural adjustment was pioneered in Chile by the military regime installed in 1973 with a right-wing political project to arrest and reverse the development process under way, and to demobilise the social and political forces which, with Salvador Allende, had captured the presidency and threatened the status quo of the propertied and political classes. The economic reforms designed by a team of technocrats, the 'Chicago Boys', and implemented by the regime between 1975 and 1981 were so deep and far-reaching that Ronald McKinnon, a World Bank economist and one of the architects of the Washington Consensus on appropriate policy, observed in a Central Bank memo [Santiago 1977] that "the Chilean government has made more sweeping rationalisations... than has occurred in any economy in modern history".|publisher=Economic and Political Weekly|volume=Vol. 28, No. 39}}</ref><ref>{{Citation|author=Giles Mohan and Frangton Chiyemura|year=2020|title=International Encyclopedia of Human Geography|chapter=Structural Adjustment|quote=In September 1973, a US-backed coup d’état in Chile ousted the left-leaning Salvador Allende and replaced him with General Pinochet. Pinochet and his allies in the United States put in place an economic model that removed labor regulations and brutally suppressed dissent. The intellectual support came from a group of economists based in the University of Chicago and led by Milton Friedman. These “Chicago Boys” were the architects of the neoliberal policies in Chile, which acted as a test bed for ideas that would soon come to dominate policy.|doi=10.1016/B978-0-08-102295-5.10712-7}}</ref>
+In the 1980s and 1990s, the policies advocated by the imperialist-led international financial institutions were inspired by the so-called "[[Washington Consensus]]" and focused on promoting neoliberal policies, implemented mainly via Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs).<ref name=":1" /><ref>{{Citation|author=Vijay Prashad|year=2007|title=The Darker Nations|quote=Gradually the IMF created procedures for accountability and punishment, generally as a poor report against the country that might lead to a dearth of commercial finance. States outside the G-7 that took IMF money had to submit to a total makeover of their political and economic relations. In March 1980, the World Bank would give these sorts of policies a name, “Structural Adjustment loan,” which would soon be called the Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP).}}</ref> According to the International Encyclopedia of Human Geography, the mid-late 1980s was the high point of SAPs, when 64 countries had one in place.<ref name=":8" />
+In 1988, describing the internal attitude of the IMF at the time of this neoliberal shift, IMF whistleblower Davison Budhoo wrote that the IMF's aim was essentially to have the global South "'privatised' or die":<blockquote>About five years ago President [[Ronald Reagan|Reagan]] effectively told us to go out and make the Third World a new bastion of free wheeling capitalism, and how we responded with joy, and with a sense of mission! Of course the entire strategy for propagating Third World economic rebirth into unfettered free enterprise was finalized and explicitly stated in the Baker Plan of 1985 and in the eligibility criteria to Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility to the 62 'poorest' countries of the world. Thus everything we did from 1983 onward was based on our new sense of mission to have the south 'privatised' or die; towards this end we ignominiously created bedlam in Latin America and Africa in 1983-88.<ref>{{Citation|author=Davison L. Budhoo|year=1988|title=Enough is Enough}}</ref></blockquote>By 1998, a [[Foreign Policy in Focus]] article commented that "[v]irtually all developing countries [...] have implemented or are in the process of acceding to SAPs."<ref>{{Web citation|author=Jason Oringer and Carol Welch|newspaper=Foreign Policy in Focus|title=Structural Adjustment Programs|date=1998-04-01|url=https://fpif.org/structural_adjustment_programs/|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20250324104729/https://fpif.org/structural_adjustment_programs/|archive-date=2025-03-24}}</ref>
-While the establishment of the Bank and Fund was presented as an apolitical effort to rebuild the world economy in the aftermath of the Second World War, they served as a method to defend or expand the reach of western capitalism in the face of a potential challenge from the [[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (1922–1991)|Soviet Union]], and to promote US interests in particular. In the 1980s and 1990s, the policies championed by the BWIs were inspired in principle by the so-called "Washington Consensus", which focused ideologically on promoting free-market economic policies such as deregulation, privatisation and trade liberalisation, as well as targeting unlimited economic growth, and were implemented primarily through Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). The devastating impacts of SAPs have been enduring and persist to this day.<ref name=":1" />
 == By country ==