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| Republic of South Africa iNingizimu Afrika | |
|---|---|
 Flag
 Coat of arms
| |
Motto: ǃke e: ǀxarra ǁke Unity in diversity | |
 | |
| Capital | Pretoria (executive) Cape Town (legislative) Bloemfontein (judicial) |
| Largest city | Johannesburg |
| Official languages | Afrikaans English Ndebele Sepedi Sesotho Setswana Swazi Tshivenda Xhosa Xitsonga Zulu |
| Dominant mode of production | Capitalism |
| Government | Unitary parliamentary republic with an executive presidency |
• President | Cyril Ramaphosa |
• Deputy President | Paul Mashatile |
• Speaker of the National Assembly | Thoko Didiza |
• Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces | Refilwe Mtsweni-Tsipane |
| Legislature | Parliament |
| National Council of Provinces | |
| National Assembly | |
| Area | |
• Total | 1,221,037 km² |
| Population | |
• 2022 census | 62,027,503 (23rd) |
• Density | 50.8 km² (169th) |
| Currency | South African rand (ZAR) |
| Driving side | left |
| Calling code | +27 |
| ISO 3166 code | ZA |
| Internet TLD | .za |
South Africa, officially the Republic of South Africa, is the southernmost country in Africa with a coastline that borders both the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. It borders Namibia and Botswana to the northwest, Zimbabwe, Eswatini, and Mozambique to the northeast and it encloses Lesotho.
History[edit | edit source]
Pre-colonization[edit | edit source]
South Africa has been continuously inhabited by humans for nearly two million years and is one of the regions where modern humans evolved during the Middle Stone Age, between 200,000 and 100,000 years ago. Significant social changes began around 2,000 years ago when several waves of migrants moved southward from West and Central Africa. These groups brought with them domesticated animals and crops, as well as technologies such as pottery-making, mining, and metalworking. The Khoikhoi, former hunter-gatherers in Botswana, adopted domesticated sheep and cattle from these Iron Age migrants and migrated south toward the Cape Coast. Simultaneously, Bantu-speaking Iron Age migrants settled south of the Limpopo River and rapidly expanded across eastern South Africa. By AD 400, they had established settlements in KwaZulu-Natal, and by AD 600, they settled the Eastern Cape.[1]
Dutch colonization[edit | edit source]
On 6 April 1652, a group of 90 European colonists, employed by the Dutch East India Company, arrived at Table Bay to establish the Cape Colony. At the time of their arrival, an estimated 75,000 Khoikhoi pastoralists and San hunter-gatherers inhabited the region known today as the Northern Cape, Western Cape, and Eastern Cape provinces.[1]
Initially intended to be a modest resupply post for ships traversing the Europe-Asia trade route, the Cape Colony gradually expanded over the following century. [1] Through systematic colonisation, land encroachment, and the appropriation of resources, by 1795, the Colony had come to occupy the entirety of the area today known as the Western Cape. This expansion caused the widespread dispossession of the Khoikhoi and San peoples, whose pastoral and hunter-gatherer livelihoods were disrupted by the seizure of pastures, livestock, and water sources,[2] as well as the capture, enslavement[3] and extermination[4] of their people.
In the early 19th century the colony was seized by the British during the Napoleonic Wars.[5]
British colonization[edit | edit source]
Although the British Empire defeated the Boer settlers, they let them create their own states where Africans were racially segregated from the Europeans.[6]
Griqualand diamond rush and annexation[edit | edit source]
The discovery of diamonds in Griqua and BaThlaping territory north of the Cape Colony spurred a diamond rush in 1867. The indigenous Griqua and BaTlhaping were soon overwhelmed by the immigration of tens of thousands of European and African prospectors, traders, and workers.[7] The Orange Free State and the British Empire made competing claims for control over the European immigrants, whereas the Griqua and BaTlhaping made competing claims for control over the territory. This dispute was referred to arbitrtion and decided in favour of the Griqua claim to the territory. However, as the Griqua lacked the administrative capacity to govern such a large population on their territory, the Griqua captain Nicolaas Waterboer allowed the British to formally annex the territory in October 1871, which the British then dubbed 'The Griqualand West Colony'.[8][9]
A class society soon developed on the Griqualand West diamondfields. Most of the land was sold to Europeans, as the British government did not recognise private title among the Griqua or BaTlhaping,[10] and few Africans could afford to purchase private title in the land. The proprietors sold digging licences for permission to mine diamonds on their land claims, and these license holders—'diggers'—employed the workers who actually mined the diamonds.[11] Although virtually all of the workers were non-European, initially many of the diggers were non-European as well.[12][13][14]
The Griqualand diggers' rebellion[edit | edit source]
When the profitability of the diamond fields declined, the European section of the diggers expressed their economic dissatisfaction through racist agitation against their non-European competitors and workforce. The European diggers petitioned the British government to legislate stricter controls over the diamond trade, regulate the workforce, and prohibit non-Europeans from holding digging licences. The liberal-minded British government initially resisted the European diggers' demands due to the racist legislation and public expenditure which they would be required to implement.[15][16]
The European diggers' frustrations peaked in 1875 and they rebelled; the diggers mustered armed European men to patrol the diamond fields and harass non-Europeans.[17] To end the rebellion, the British government enrolled a volunteer police force to disband the rebels, but the presence of armed non-Europeans among the volunteers only further aggravated the rebels.[18] However, the rebellion quickly dissipated when the British government sent a force of approximately 300 troops from the Cape to arrest the rebels. Although the rebel leaders were prosecuted,[19] most of the rebels' demands were immediately implemented by the British government. New legislation limited the issue of further digging licenses, strictly regulated the workforce on the mines, and impressed the unemployed into public works.[20] It has been argued that the 1875 diggers' rebellion prefigured the racist labour politics on the Witwatersrand gold mines and that the labour controls first devised on the Griqualand diamond fields functioned as the framework for later segregationist labour policies.[21][22]
Ultimately, however, the diggers as a class did not survive long; all eventually ceded their claims to mining consortiums once diamond mining became more capital intensive.[23]
African dockworkers first struck in 1874.[24] At the 1885 Berlin Conference, European powers divided and colonized Africa, and the British took control of what is now South Africa.[25] They fought against the Boers again from 1899 to 1902.[26] Africans rebelled again in 1906 under the leadership of Bambatha kaMancinza following a poll tax.[25] In 1910, the UK united various Boer settlements and British colonies into a single state.[26]
Apartheid era[edit | edit source]
The Afrikaner Nationalist Party took power in 1948 and had direct connections to German fascism.[26]
During the apartheid era, many Black Africans were confined to puppet states called Bantustans that were nominally independent. Bantustans made up 13% of the country's area and were on poor land far from urban areas. Africans who left the Bantustans without identification documents could be arrested and deported to the nearest Bantustan.[27]
In 1960, white supremacist forces killed members of the Pan-Africanist Congress who were protesting against apartheid in the Sharpeville massacre. Dockworkers in Durban struck in 1969 and again in 1972. Inkatha, a reactionary Zulu nationalist organization, opposed the strikes.[24]
The CIA suppressed the anti-apartheid movement from the 1960s to 1980s and provided information about ANC members and activities. In 1981, they sent the South African military into Mozambique to assassinate ANC members in exile. The CIA was responsible for the arrest of Nelson Mandela and violated a UN policy by sending weapons to South Africa.[28]
In the 1980s, the United States provided hundreds of thousands of dollars to South African media to promote Western bourgeois ideals and counter Marxism.[29]
Apartheid South Africa supported Rhodesia's racist government and invaded Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia.[30]
Post-apartheid[edit | edit source]
In the 2024 national election, the alliance of the ANC, SACP, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions secured a combined 40.18% compared to 59.50% in 2019. The MK and EFF parties, which previously broke away from the ANC, secured 14.58% and 9.52% respectively.[31]
The richest 1% of the population controls more than 40% of the wealth.[32]
In May 2026, various organizations in South Africa convened for a "Conference of the Left" organized by the South African Communist Party (SACP), with attendance by organizations such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC), Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), uMkhonto weSizwe Party (MKP), the Socialist Party of Azania, Workers' Socialist Party, Independent Labour Party, key trade union federations, and other Marxist and Pan-Africanist formations, as well as international solidarity delegates and guests.[33]
Current racial inequality[edit | edit source]
White settlers own over 70% of South Africa's farmland despite only being 8% of the population,[34] whereas Africans only own 4% of the farmland.[35] The average income for settlers is five times higher than for Black Africans.[27]
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Hermann Giliomee, Bernard Mbenga, Bill Nasson (2022). New History of South Africa (pp. 6,7). Tafelberg. ISBN 9780624092230
- ↑ Richard Elphick (1985). Khoikhoi and the founding of White South Africa (pp. 173,174).
- ↑ “In the 19th century the tradition of slave raiding, as practiced by Boers and trekboers in the eastern Cape, spread with the advancement of the Dutch frontier. Captive indigenes, the booty of countless commando raids, helped to satisfy the labor demands of these cash-poor pastoral farmers before the abolition of the overseas slave trade and became one of their principal labor sources for decades after. Until the 1820s, their victims were mainly Khoisan men, women, and children, but as these populations dispersed or vanished and trekboers and later Voortrekkers moved further into the interior, Bantu-speaking peoples—BaTswana, BaSotho, and Nguni-speakers—served their purposes. The effect on highveld societies was devastating. Such frontier communities as the Bastaards, Griqua, and Kora themselves escaped enslavement by raiding innocent Khoikhoi and BaTswana and exchanging captives in eastern Cape markets for guns and ammunition. The BaTswana of Transorangia had to defend themselves from slave-raids at the same time they were beset with severe ecological crises. In brief, the sustained, high level of violence with which Dutch-speakers expanded their control over land and people beyond the Cape frontier seriously disrupted the demographic and political stability of indigenous societies. In some cases, it destroyed them altogether. The ultimate source of the upheavals of the 1820s and 1830s in the Cape interior predates the arrival of refugees from the east and the formation of the AmaNdebele miUtary state and lays instead in a long-term process of raiding for cattle and slaves that originated on the Cape frontier in the eighteenth century and continued in the 19th century as Dutch-speaking pastoralists migrated inland. Evidence that slave raiding pervaded the frontier is contained in contemporary accounts published by European travelers and missionaries.”
Eldredge, Elizabeth (1994). Slavery in South Africa: Captive labour on the Dutch frontier - eds. Elizabeth Eldredge & Fred Morton: 'Chapter 5: Slave raiding across the Cape Frontier' (pp. 93-126). Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. ISBN 0869809075 - ↑ “San (Bushman) society in the Cape Colony was almost completely annihilated during the 18th and 19th centuries as a result of land confiscation, massacre, forced labour and cultural suppression that accompanied colonial rule. [. . .] Much of the dispossession and slaughter happened in the 18th century along the northern and northeastern frontiers under Dutch East India Company (DEIC, also VOC) rule, with continued displacement and killing under the relatively benign auspices of British imperialism through the 19th century. The main agents of destruction were Dutch-speaking pastoralists whose murderous land-grabbing and ecologically damaging farming practices ensured the virtual extinction of Cape San society.”
Adhikari, Mohamed (2010). A total extinction confidently hoped for: the destruction of Cape San society under Dutch colonial rule, 1700 –1795. Journal of Genocide Research, vol.12 (pp. 19-44). Routlege: Taylor & Francis Group. doi: 10.1080/14623528.2010.508274 [HUB] - ↑ A. B. Davidson (1979). The Great Soviet Encyclopedia: 'South Africa, Republic of'.
- ↑ Domenico Losurdo (2011). Liberalism: A Counter-History: 'The West and the Barbarians' (pp. 221–222). [PDF] Verso. ISBN 9781844676934 [LG]
- ↑ “The Coloured Griqua had lived in the area of the diamond fields since c. 1800. Under chief Nicholas Waterboer, some land alienation had preceded the discovery of diamonds. In 1867 a block of land had been offered to British farmers from the Cape, to serve as a buffer against Afrikaner encroachment. Although Waterboer retained little control over these settlers, they did not present an immediate threat to his government. With the opening of the diamond fields, in the late 1860s, however, an enormous number of miners, traders, shopkeepers, transport drivers and others flooded in. Claims were staked, often by force, private rights were ignored, and individuals bought up land for ridiculously low prices. The area in question, from 40 to 50 miles below the Orange-Vaal confluence to about 100 miles up the Vaal, contained by 1871 a total population of around 37,000, nearly half of whom were white.”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, 43–44). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “Most of the early diggers were British subjects, and this provided the pretext for British intervention in a situation of near anarchy, culminating in control of the region. The territory was disputed by the Orange Free State, the South African Republic, the Griqua and the Tlhaping section of the Tswana. None of these could control the diggers. The British, however, moved rapidly, with the concurrence of Nicholas Waterboer, to appoint a magistrate, claiming authority over the white (mostly British) diggers and accepting Waterboer's claim of authority over the actual territory. The Free State had also appointed a landrost, but his authority was resisted by the diggers, who insisted on their rights as British subjects. Later, however, when the Orange Free State appeared to be more amenable to strict control of labor, the diggers claimed to favor Free State rule. The British government at this stage (late 1870) was reluctant to extend jurisdiction to the point of outright control, and hoped that eventually the Cape would take over the diamond fields. Meanwhile, the Cape governor, Sir Henry Barkly, was instructed to preserve order and prevent the expulsion of the indigenous inhabitants. The appointment of the British magistrate, John Campbell, was generally accepted by the diggers, but the position did not embody sufficient authority to maintain order. In early 1871, Campbell was also appointed by Waterboer's government as a Griqua official, a position which theoretically allowed him to settle disputes, establish courts and other machinery of government and to license canteens and other enterprises.'
[. . .]
By sanctioning Campbell's appointment as a British official, Waterboer continued the process, begun with the alienation of the buffer zone, of abrogation of authority in the territory he claimed. Now he relinquished control of aliens within his territory, although he had formerly claimed such jurisdiction. In October 1871 Waterboer finally ceded Griqualand to the British, being completely unable to control the population of the diamond fields. He assumed that he would retain jurisdiction over his own people, and that their claims to land would be quickly settled, but this was not to be the case.”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 44-45). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “As the country became settled, population increased, and the land became valuable, disputes arose between the Boers and native headmen the cause of the former was taken up by the Transvaal Republic, that of the latter by the Government of Griqualand West. Commissioners were appointed by each Government to define the boundary between the Transvaal in this direction and the independent native tribes. Each Commissioner reported in favour of the view taken by his own Government.
The question was by consent referred for arbitration to Mr. Keate, then Lieutenant Governor of Natal, who decided in favour of the line traced by the English Commissioner, and so gave all the territory to the native tribes.”
Frere, Bartle (1883 (written in September 1879)). Memoranda and letters on Bechuanaland, written at various times by Bartle Frere: 'Memorandum on the Bloemhof and Christiana Districts, and the Keate Award, Transvaal and Griqualand West' (pp. 1–2). - ↑ “Because of the property qualifications required for the franchise, few Griqua or Tlhaping were able to vote, as private titles to their land were as yet unrecognized.”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 45). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “The diggers originally derived their rights from a Free State ordinance (No. 3 of 1871) which acknowledged the rights of the proprietors to the minerals, but also the rights of miners to dig after paying a license fee set by the proprietor. J. X. Merriman, who was then a diamond buyer, argued that this "right" had been extorted from the OFS by threat of mob violence. The British at the Cape objected to this ordinance, but later took it over when they annexed Griqualand.”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875, vol. 12. Boston University African Studies Center: International Journal of African Historical Studies. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “At the outset in Kimberley there was less distinction between owners and laborers; men often worked their own claims, gradually hiring laborers. Nor were these two classes coterminous with racial categories—claim owners were often non-white. (p. 42)
[. . .]
In the early days of the diamond fields there was already class division, but not strictly along racial lines. Though the laborers were all African, the owners of claims, employers of labor, traders and transport riders were white, black and Coloured. (p. 52)”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 42 and 52). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “Labor had been drawn to the fields from all over Southern Africa and included Tswana, Basuto, Zulu, Swazi, Xhosa, Shona, Ndebele and inadequately identified "coloureds."' Of these, however, almost none were from Griqualand; only 54 of over 7,000 laborers registered in 1878 were local people.”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 46). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “In the early days many nonwhites (probably Cape coloured, possibly Griqua, but not officially identified) held claims; this was a major grievance among the white diggers, and nonwhite claim-holders were eventually squeezed out, partly by legislation (stricter licensing rules were applied to nonwhites) partly by harassment (the laborers of nonwhite claim-holders were treated with great suspicion).”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 46–47). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “The economically rooted dissatisfaction of the white diggers was most frequently expressed in racial terms. As revenue from claims declined, anger was directed against competing nonwhite claimholders. As labor became scarce, opposition was raised to government attempts to regulate the treatment of black laborers; the diggers also objected to the presence of any Africans in the fields who were not actually working for whites. [. . .] Some of the diggers had petitioned the commissioners, asking that no "Kaffir" or other nonwhite be allowed hold licenses to dig, sell, buy, or in any way deal with diamonds (except, of course, as laborers who would be subject to strict registration, searches and control of movement).(p. 48.)
[. . .]
The diggers were primarily interested in controlling black labor, and tried to put pressure on the government to comply. The government, they alleged, was blind to "native debauchery" and to the unrestricted sale of firearms which intimidated the white community. 'The Diamond Field', a local newspaper, supporting the diggers' "Committee of Public Safety," attributed "the ruin of the whites to the servant having been elevated, in the name of Waterboer and England, to an equality, as regards the right to hold property, with his master." "The only point on which the malcontents join issue," an observer noted,"is niggers being allowed to hold claims." (pp. 50–51)
[. . .]
The Diamond Field believed that the attitude of British officials benefited the "native thieves and the stolen diamond buyers" and proposed a new licensing board system, which would permit the British to save face without violating the constitution by permitting the board to eliminate as applicants for licenses "all improper persons... I need not describe those persons or their colour.... This would have the effect of class legislation though it is not class legislation.." (p. 52)
[. . .]
What the white diggers aimed at was the merging of racial and class distinctions, the destroying of the multi-racial entrepreneurial class that existed, and the equation of "laborer" with "nonwhite" and "digger" "'white." All the carefully worded demands of the diggers had the single aim of eliminating nonwhite competition. (pp. 52–53)
[. . .]
However limited in scope, the revolt was significant in its causes and effects. The main motivation was the desire of the white diggers to exclude non-whites from the mining industry in all capacities except that of a carefully controlled labor force. (p. 44)”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 48–53). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “The decline in earnings was one cause of the miners' dissatisfaction, which in turn necessitated stronger government. The new government's interest in stronger control rapidly involved it in conflict with the diggers, especially in its attempt to regulate black-white relations in accordance with the relatively liberal principles of the Cape.
(p. 48)
[T]he government claimed that nonwhite British subjects were entitled to the same licences and privileges as the whites. (p. 48)
[. . .]
The government claimed that African labor was controlled, citing the number of arrests, emphasizing the good behavior of most nonwhites and determining (at least officially) to protect them from oppression. [. . .] The various petitions presented by the diggers were regarded as representing only a faction, and not the wealth or intelligence of the European community; "much less does it represent the coloured inhabitants, of whom there are many thousands, whose interests and rights it is the duty of the Government to care for and preserve. (p. 50)”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875, vol. 12. Boston University African Studies Center: International Journal of African Historical Studies. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “By March 1875 the diggers had taken matters into their own hands. A meeting early in the month, dominated by Alfred Aylward (an Irish ex-soldier widely described as a "Fenian") ended with the raising of the "black flag of revolt" and a call to arms. Shortly thereafter, the Diggers' Protective Association formed armed bodies for "mutual protection" and began drilling and patrolling. At the end of the month a well-armed group of cavalry and infantry paraded, consisting of about eighty men. Rumors of a much larger potential force persisted, however. The men actually under arms were said to be vastly outnumbered by reserves, while volunteering continued.
Up to 800 men were said to be forming at least five separate units of cavalry, infantry, rifles and signal corps. Both the Cape and the diamond fields newspapers reported these rumors, which seem to have been widely exaggerated, both as to the size and the degree of organization of the diggers' forces. The Argus was of the opinion that the patrols should be stamped out-though believing that it would take at least five hundred men to do so. Though it was conceded that grievances existed, the resort to unnecessary violence was attributed by the Argus to non-English elements on the mines—Americans, Germans and especially "Fenian" Irish. [. . .] The government issued proclamations against illegal drilling and patrolling, yet the diggers continued to parade with arms, assaulting nonwhites and actively resisting government injunctions (while disavowing treasonable intent).”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 54). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 55-56). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB]
- ↑ “Eventually it was decided to send British troops in order to avert "the utterly inadmissable alternative of arming the coloured population." The sending of troops had been a possibility all along, given the insufficent force available in Griqualand and the indecision about volunteer troops. The creation of volunteer forces did not improve the situation, and so sufficient troops to arrest and prosecute the leaders of the Diggers' Association were dispatched in May under the direction of General Cunyngehame, Commander of British troops in South Africa. This was arranged solely by Barkly and Southey. Barkly complained that there was no official request from the Legislative or Executive Councils or the residents of Griqualand for British troops. The force of 250 infantry and sixty other assorted troops took over a month to arrive, due to the difficulty of transport and supplies. Once they did arrive, however, the diggers' revolt collapsed. All that was needed, evidently, was a show offorce; the leaders were arrested, a general amnesty was issued to the rest of
the disaffected diggers, and the Association disbanded (though it is not clear whether or not the individuals disarmed). Six leaders were arrested immediately, three more later, and ultimately, in September, seven of them were tried for riot and sedition. Four, including Tucker, the president of the Association, pleaded guilty to
a charge of unlawful assembly, and the other charges were dropped. Three others were acquitted, though Barkly regarded this a "miscarriage of justice."”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 57). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “In fact, the diggers had gained many of their demands. The issuing of licenses to nonwhites became less and less common, and control of labor was greater. [. . .] Retrospectively, the British position seems pointless in terms of nonwhite rights, as these rapidly disappeared after the diggers' revolt. (p. 59)
[. . .]
More stringent rules regulating nonwhite labor were passed, for the "better protection of labour" and for preventing desertion and vagrancy. To ensure an orderly supply of labor, depots were established where laborers assembled to be issued passes to enter Griqualand. The passes had to be produced on demand, foreshadowing a wider South African practice. Agreements of service had to be contracted through the depot system; if one did not obtain work within five days, one was subject to employment on public works. In 1877 W Coleman was appointed " Protector of Contracted Natives," presumably to ensure the regular operation of the system. These measures, of course, served to control labor for the benefit of the employer, rather than to protect the laborer. [. . .] Illicit diamond dealing, always widespread, continued even after the diggers' revolt; the licensing laws in force up to the middle of 1876 were ineffective. The guiding principle was that one must "be of good character" to hold a claim or be a dealer, but it was difficult to ascertain character, although this clause was used to refuse licenses to nonwhites. The alleged involvement of blacks in diamond smuggling was cited here. The Crossman Report, commissioned after the disturbances, suggested the creation of boards of government nominees and representatives of mining interests to regulate diamond dealing. It was hoped that the vigilance of the diggers themselves would combat theft (although this sounds like an invitation to harrass nonwhites). Crossman also recommended specific measures for dealing with nonwhites. The policy of depots where labor would collect was his suggestion. He also proposed abolishing the sale of guns to nonwhites, the use of distinctive badges for servants and the restriction of their movements at night, a decrease in the number of canteens, a vagrancy law, and a police force of at least one hundred. Finally, he argued, it would be "absurd to give all these black men the right of voting for members of Council." As to the complaints of the Griqua about the still unissued land titles, Crossman advised an increase in Waterboer's pension; apparently the government hoped to silence complaints by buying off the chief. (p. 58)”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61, at 58–59). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ “The [1875 diggers'] revolt was the first step in the growth of the South African white trade union movement. The theme of racial division within the working class, so obvious on the Rand, began here. [. . .] The demands of the diggers for greater control of black labor, however, came about within two decades; Gold mining on the Rand, from the start, was a matter of white ownership and skilled labor, and a very tightly regulated black labor force. (p. 40)
[. . .]
Many of the patterns of later industrial relations were set at an early date on the diamond fields. The major gold magnates—Rhodes, Barnato, Beit, and others had begun on the diamond fields and had simply transferred the methods they had developed. White demands that blacks have no rights of ownership in the mines were met by government legislation. This was later followed by the freezing of African laborers in low-paid, unskilled positions, especially as they acquired the skills to compete with white workers. The system of migrant, contracted African labor began here, as did the means of controlling it by compounds, pass laws, and firearms regulations. From the earliest days, the diamond fields were marked by conflict between the diggers and the government over the position of African labor; this conflict often expressed itself in racial terms. The diggers' revolt of 1875 was one violent expression of this conflict which otherwise constantly simmered at a lower pitch. In its causes and attitudes the diggers' revolt closely resembles the later agitation of the white gold miners trying to maintain their position above that of African labor, which culminated in the 1922 Rand Revolt. Class consciousness existed, but in both cases it coincided with and was expressed in terms of racial discrimination. (pp. 41-42)
[. . .]
[T]he demands of the diggers for increased control of nonwhites led to stricter control of both nonwhite and white labor, and much of the experience of the diamond fields in labor control was later applied to the gold mines, where from the start large companies precluded the establishment of individual claims. Labor was always on a large scale and strictly regulated on the Rand, where racial categories were firmly established from the beginning, aided by the fact that the local Afrikaner government had no pretensions to the color-blind official policy and liberal rhetoric of the Cape. Griqualand did stop short of purely racial legislation, but set up models of labor control which were in effect racial, and these were made officially so on the Rand. (p. 61)”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ Economic Freedom Fighters (23 May 2025). "EFF Podcast Episode 72| Kill the Boer, Kill the Farmer & Budget 3.0 Unpacked (Interview with Zwelinzima Vavi)". YouTube.
- ↑ “The diggers achieved little for themselves. Diamond mining quickly became mechanized, and the small claimholder was squeezed out. (p. 40)
[. . .]
Although much of the legislation the diggers sought eventually came about, they were not the ones to benefit. As a group, they gradually declined from independent claimholders to a laboring class, competing ever more strenuously with the African workers. Individual miners were being forced out by the early 1870s as the supply of diamonds at the easily-mined upper levels became exhausted, although some stayed on as skilled labor. The nonwhite claim owners also disappeared as individual claims became amalgamated. The high costs of machinery necessary for mining at the lower levels rapidly forced out the remaining individual diggers. By 1885 less than a hundred properties existed at Kimberley, and mergers continued until the De Beers Consolidated Mine controlled the entire output of diamonds. (p. 61)”
Sutton (1979). The diggers' revolt in Griqualand West, 1875. The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol.12 (pp. 40-61). Boston University African Studies Center. doi: 10.2307/218002 [HUB] - ↑ 24.0 24.1 "The 1973 Durban Strikes: Building Popular Democratic Power in South Africa" (2023-01-24). Tricontinental. Archived from the original on 2023-01-24. Retrieved 2023-02-10.
- ↑ 25.0 25.1 "South Africa and the continental struggle for socialism" (2014-01-26). Liberation News. Archived from the original on 2019-07-14. Retrieved 2022-07-02.
- ↑ 26.0 26.1 26.2 Josie Mpama (2023-03-31). "Josie Mpama" Tricontinental. Archived from the original on 2023-04-12. Retrieved 2023-04-16.
- ↑ 27.0 27.1 Lewis Barnes (2018-05-05). "South Africa: Major developments in the long struggle for land reform" Liberation News. Archived from the original on 2019-07-14. Retrieved 2022-07-02.
- ↑ William Blum (2002). Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower: 'A Concise History of United States Global Interventions, 1945 to the Present' (pp. 122–123). [PDF] Zed Books Ltd. ISBN 9781842772201 [LG]
- ↑ Ajit Singh, Roscoe Palm (2022-08-08). "Manufacturing consent: How the United States has penetrated South African media" Monthly Review. Archived from the original on 2022-08-08. Retrieved 2022-08-09.
- ↑ "South Africa and the continental struggle for socialism" (2014-01-26). Liberation News. Archived from the original on 2019-07-14. Retrieved 2022-07-02.
- ↑ “ANC 40.18%, DA 21.81%, M.K. 14.58%, EFF 9.52%, IFP 3.85%, PA 2.06%, VF+ 1.36%, ACTIONSA 1.2%”
Independent Electoral Comission (IEC) of South Africa. "NPE Results Dashboard 2024" IEC Election Results. Retrieved 2025-01-21. - ↑ "This Land Is the Land of Our Ancestors" (2022-06-22). Tricontinental. Archived from the original on 2022-09-05. Retrieved 2022-11-12.
- ↑ Nicholas Mwangi (2026-05-30). "South Africa’s Conference of the Left issues a bold call for working-class unity" Peoples Dispatch.
- ↑ Francis Njubi Nesbitt (2018-08-27). "In South Africa, Trump Embraces a Global Neo-Nazi Myth" MintPress News. Retrieved 2022-07-02.
- ↑ "This Land Is the Land of Our Ancestors" (2022-06-22). Tricontinental. Archived from the original on 2022-09-05. Retrieved 2022-11-12.