Communist Party in Saudi Arabia

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Communist Party in Saudi Arabia الحزب الشيوعي في السعودية
Abbreviation	CPSA
Founded	August 31, 1975
Dissolved	1991
Newspaper	Tareeq al-Kadiḥeen
Youth wing	Union of Democratic Youth - Saudi Arabia
Political orientation	Communism

The Communist Party in Saudi Arabia (CPSA, al-Hizb-Shuyuʿi fi al-Suʿudiyya), was a communist party in Saudi Arabia.

Since the early 1950s, early communist activists had been active in Saudi Arabia and played a significant role in the large-scale oil field labor movement in the Eastern Province between 1953 and 1956. The strikes severely disrupted oil production at the US-owned Aramco. The Saudi authorities eventually intervened to suppress the movement. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia's first quasi-communist organization—the National Liberation Front (jabhat al-taharrur al-watani)—was established.

This labor movement shook the entire nation and the deeply divided Saudi royal family. The founder of the Saudi Kingdom, Abdulaziz, died in 1953, and his designated successor, Saud, ascended to the throne. However, his half-brother and Crown Prince Faisal soon began to challenge him. Both men, especially Saud, occasionally sought alliances with progressive officials, including a group of Arab nationalist-oriented princes known as the "Free Princes" around Prince Talal.

This period was formative for the political careers of many Saudi leftists, including Mahdi Habib, the later General Secretary of the Communist Party of Saudi Arabia (CPSA). Habib's real name was Mustafa Hafiz Wahba, and he was likely one of the highest-ranking Saudi officials to join the CPSA. Born in Kuwait, his father, Hafiz Wahba, was a close confidant of King Abdulaziz and the first Saudi ambassador to the UK. Mustafa studied economics at Cambridge University and worked with his father at the Saudi embassy. In 1954, he returned to Jeddah to work for the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

At this time, Saudi oil official Abdullah al-Tariki, a progressive figure who later co-founded OPEC in 1960, encouraged Mustafa to collaborate with him on Eastern Province issues, particularly concerning oil. In 1960, Mustafa became Undersecretary of the Ministry of Finance in the short-lived reformist government of the so-called "Red Prince," Talal. However, in 1962, when Crown Prince Faisal moved to consolidate his power, Mustafa was fired along with other progressive officials (Saud eventually abdicated in favor of Faisal in 1964). Initially, Mustafa was allowed to remain in the Kingdom, but his close ties to the "Free Princes" and to al-Tariki drew the King's suspicion. In 1968, King Faisal ordered him to leave the Kingdom within 24 hours and revoked the Saudi citizenship of him and his family. Forced to live in Kuwait for a time, Mustafa subsequently played a role in founding the CPSA.

As the Cold War intensified, from the mid-1950s until 1967, the Arab world also became divided in a period known as the "Arab Cold War."

In the 1960s, Yemen became the focal point of this regional Cold War.

After South Yemen, later the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), gained independence, it gradually became a base for leftist revolutionaries across the peninsula. They waged a guerrilla war in Oman's Dhofar province and attempted to "liberate" the entire Arabian Peninsula and the Upper Gulf states from there. Especially in its early years, South Yemen adopted a strongly anti-Saudi stance. King Faisal and other senior Saudi officials grew increasingly concerned about the threat emanating from South Yemen. The King believed communism was orchestrating a global conspiracy in alliance with Zionism, and thus vowed to fight both by all possible means.

On March 25, 1975, Faisal died in a palace coup. After the new King Khalid ascended to the throne, he issued a general amnesty and allowed exiles to return. Many Saudi leftists and Arab nationalists welcomed this offer. That year, and indeed across the Arab region, there were signs of a revival in the communist movement. For instance, during the 1975 May Day celebrations, the Egyptian Communist Party, which had dissolved a decade earlier, announced its reestablishment.

Under these new conditions, Saudi progressives decided to intensify their activities. In August 1974, the leadership of the National Liberation Front formed the "Preparatory Committee for the First Congress of Saudi Communists." The Congress convened on August 31, 1975, formally establishing the Communist Party in Saudi Arabia (CPSA). It also elected a Central Committee and a Politburo, with Mahdi Habib as its General Secretary. The Congress determined the party's name as CPSA (Communist Party in Saudi Arabia) instead of the Saudi Communist Party – reflecting a deliberate downplaying of the term "Saudi."

The views of many early CPSA members were quite radical, standing out even within the Middle East. Soviet representatives attending the Congress deemed the CPSA's rhetoric and demands unrealistic and overly radical. Under strong pressure from the Soviet Union, the draft party program was compelled to be rewritten. The party ultimately adopted a program that included an alliance with the Soviet Union, demands for a constitution, the establishment of a parliament, and the nationalization of Saudi Arabia's oil resources.

Although the party was small, its membership was quite diverse. Some individuals released in the 1975 amnesty ceased political activities after leaving prison, while others joined the newly formed CPSA and formed the backbone of its clandestine organization. Alongside veterans of the 1950s labor movement and their families, the party also recruited officials, journalists, and businessmen.

The primary threat posed by the CPSA to Saudi Arabia lay in its ability to unite a broad range of allies across regional, tribal, sectarian, and religious lines using a "class-based" stance, and its symbolic significance as a vehicle for atheism. Consequently, membership in the CPSA was illegal in Saudi Arabia and could lead to long-term imprisonment. The CPSA operated through a structure of leaders in exile and grassroots organizations within the country. Members organized themselves into cells, and all began using pseudonyms. Even after many years, members did not know the real names of their leaders. A member from Riyadh became the primary conduit between the grassroots organizations and the leadership around Mahdi Habib.

As a small party with limited domestic foundations, the CPSA faced severe crackdowns from its very inception. Consequently, the CPSA became heavily reliant on support from pro-Soviet Middle Eastern countries, the Soviet Union, and other Warsaw Pact members.

The CPSA's first public appearance occurred at a joint meeting with representatives from the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and the Bahrain National Liberation Front (BNLF). The three parties declared that progressive forces in the region should strengthen cooperation to defeat imperialism and bolster the labor movement. Since 1964, Communist parties in the Arab region had been holding joint congresses. The CPSA would send delegates to these meetings and contribute articles to al-Nahj (The Path), the primary Arab Marxist theoretical journal founded in 1964. Initially, Aden in Yemen served as a significant base for the CPSA's exiled leadership. Later, Damascus and Beirut also became important operational centers for the party.

Unlike other Arab Communist parties that relied heavily on Soviet financial backing, the CPSA evidently possessed its own independent sources of funding and received only limited financial assistance from the USSR. The CPSA's activities were regularly covered in Problems of Peace and Socialism, the Marxist theoretical journal based in Prague, Czechoslovakia, which served as an important reference for the Communist movement at the time. CPSA statements were frequently disseminated via Moscow's radio broadcasts and cited by news agencies of other Soviet-bloc countries. Besides the Soviet Union, the CPSA maintained particularly close ties with East Germany.

Like other Communist parties, the CPSA also established mass organizations for students, women, and workers. However, in practice, they faced considerable difficulties in reaching the masses within Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, these organizations maintained their own internal publications and had representatives operating outside Saudi Arabia. These overseas representatives enabled them to join various international organizations, attend their annual conferences, and deliver speeches.

For example, the Saudi Committee for Peace and Solidarity was a branch of both the Helsinki-based World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization based in Cairo. The CPSA's labor wing—the Saudi Workers' Union (ittihad al-ʿummal fi al-suʿudiyya)—was established in 1984. Following the strikes of the 1950s, trade unions had been banned in Saudi Arabia. There was hope that this new CPSA branch would allow the party to engage in some less politicized work. However, this proved overly optimistic. In April 1985, the union was admitted into the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

The Saudi Democratic Youth Union (ittihad al-shabab al-dimuqrati, or UDYS) was arguably the most significant of these "mass organizations." An affiliate of the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), it was founded on August 14, 1977. UDYS published a small magazine, Nidal al-shabab (The Youth's Struggle). It also organized study trips and summer camps in Soviet bloc countries like Bulgaria, in collaboration with other Arab leftist youth organizations.

The party's student organization—the Saudi Students' Union (ittihad al-talaba fi-al-suʿudiyya)—faced difficulties connecting with the majority of Saudi students abroad, as most were studying in the Soviet bloc, while Saudi students generally favored the United States.

Although UDYS primarily recruited young men, it also attempted to attract oppressed young women. However, in Saudi Arabia, gender segregation made it extremely difficult for men to recruit and work alongside women. Consequently, the CPSA established its women's wing—the Saudi Democratic Women's Association (rabitat al-nisaʾ al-dimuqratiyyat fi al-suʿudiyya)—to increase women's participation. This organization formally joined the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) during the WIDF Congress held in Moscow in June 1987.

The women's issue held particular significance in Saudi Arabia. The CPSA advocated for the liberation of women and their inclusion in economic, social, and cultural life. To this end, the CPSA called for the abolition of all laws and institutions hindering women's freedom and equality with men, and the reform of educational sectors for both genders.

Thanks to the CPSA's influence among oil workers, the oil-rich Eastern Province has long been a vital support base for the party. Simultaneously, the Saudi Eastern Province is home to the majority of the country's Shia population. Saudi Shias, constituting about 10% of the national population, have historically faced religious and institutional discrimination.

In November 1979, inspired by the Iranian Islamic Revolution, an uprising erupted in the Shia areas of Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province. The primary organizer was the "Shia Islamic Movement," also known as the "Shirazi Movement," whose influence spanned half the Persian Gulf coast, extending from coastal regions of Iraq and Kuwait. Shia religious leaders, concerned that collaboration with leftists might undermine their social standing, did not inform the CPSA of the uprising plans. Unexpectedly, as thousands took to the streets—an event virtually unheard of in Saudi Arabia—leftists in the Eastern Province, particularly youth affiliated with the Democratic Youth League, immediately joined the demonstrations. On the streets, they raised their own banners, urging fellow Muslims to chant not for "more rights for Shias" but for "more rights for all people." Hundreds of women also participated, mostly leftists from the Shia movement.

During the subsequent severe crackdown, many young fighters were arrested, two of whom—Fidel and Faisal—were brutally killed by the Saudi authorities. The UDYS later referred to them as "comrades," though it remains unclear whether Fidel and Faisal were formal members of the CPSA or its youth league.

Besides the CPSA, another leftist party in Saudi Arabia—the Socialist Action Party in the Arabian Peninsula (Hizb alʿamal al-ishtiraki fi al-jazira al-ʿarabiyya, hereafter referred to as the Socialist Action Party)—also joined the demonstrations.

In a post-event statement, the CPSA strongly condemned the U.S. military presence in the region, asserting that it had provided military support to Saudi Arabia during the crackdown. The CPSA also argued that the cooperation between the "feudalists and big bourgeoisie" in the Shia areas and the Saudi authorities was a significant factor in the uprising's failure.

Although CPSA suffered significant losses during the crackdown, its organizational structure remained intact and was not severely weakened. Most of those arrested were released after spending only about a year in prison. Some cadres of the SAP were forced to leave Saudi Arabia and go into exile after the uprising. In 1981, they established relations with CPSA and the Popular Front in Bahrain (al-jabha al-shaʿbiyya fi al-Bahrayn, PFB).

Following the uprising, both CPSA and the SAP intensified their activities. However, in 1982, a large-scale arrest campaign dealt a devastating blow to both organizations within Saudi Arabia. A prominent SAP figure was arrested by Saudi police upon arriving in Riyadh from Damascus, and all the confidential information he was carrying fell into the hands of the Saudi authorities. Subsequently, Saudi intelligence swiftly conducted raids on the residences of senior SAP members with lightning speed, completely exposing the SAP's entire organizational structure. The SAP's liaison with CPSA was also arrested at this time and, during interrogation, revealed all information about CPSA. CPSA itself was then subjected to large-scale raids, resulting in the arrest of dozens of its members.

Previously, some leaders of both the SAP and CPSA had worked together at the newspaper al-Yawm published in Dammam. The paper's weekly literary supplement had become a gathering place for young Saudi leftist writers at the time. During the crackdown, al-Yawm was forced to cease publication in May 1982. Editors Muhammad al-ʿAli and ʿAli al-Dumayni, along with the paper's former editor-in-chief, Salih al-Dumayni, were also imprisoned.

CPSA claimed this was the first time women had been arrested in such actions and called for their release. In June 1986, the detainees were finally released after pledging to refrain from political activity. The CPSA leadership claimed that their negotiations and efforts with the Saudi government facilitated this outcome. They hailed it as a "major success achieved by the national progressive patriotic forces."

In Saudi Arabia, the CPSA was well aware that religion has always played a significant role in public life. Islam serves as the source of legitimacy for the Saudi regime, yet it is also a powerful tool for the Saudi opposition. Consequently, the CPSA called for building a united front with Muslims within the country, while simultaneously criticizing Saudi Arabia's use of radical Islam as an ideological weapon during the Cold War.

Following the 1979 Eastern Province Uprising, the CPSA published a pamphlet referring to it as the "November Uprising." Shiite Muslims, however, called it the "Muharram Uprising" because it occurred during the month of Muharram in the Islamic calendar. This differing interpretation of the uprising's name led to a dispute between the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (munazzamat al-thawra al-islamiyya fi al-jazira al-ʿarabiyya, or OIRAP) and the CPSA.

Nevertheless, throughout the 1980s, the CPSA, the Socialist Action Party, and OIRAP established connections with each other. One key reason was that many of their members abroad were based in Damascus, where they frequently interacted. At this time, the CPSA also aimed to form a national democratic front, advocating for "tactical alliances with bourgeois democratic movements in colonial and semi-colonial environments." It considered the Bani Khalid tribe (which historically dominated the Eastern Province), the Shiites, and Sunni Salafists as potential allies.

Despite some cooperation between the CPSA, the Socialist Action Party, and OIRAP, the clandestine nature of underground struggle within Saudi Arabia hindered the formation of a unified, public, national opposition alliance by the three groups.

In April 1987, the CPSA Politburo urged its domestic members to prepare for the Third Congress, stating that "the revolutionary tide in Saudi Arabia may be turning, and the CPSA could benefit from it. Therefore, comrades should establish a broad alliance... and should not be afraid of allying with Islamic forces." The goal should be "to end the absolute monarchy and achieve democracy for our people." This reflected a tendency towards flexibility and pragmatism.

Simultaneously, the CPSA criticized Saudi Arabia's use of Islam domestically and internationally—particularly in Afghanistan—asserting that "the Saudi regime uses religious channels to spread disinformation about Afghanistan." Habib condemned Saudi Arabia's activities in Afghanistan. The Democratic Youth Federation also specifically criticized Saudi military aid to Afghan guerrillas. In 1985, a CPSA delegation even attended a celebration held by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

Thus, even as Saudi intelligence personnel provided weapons and funds to the Afghan Mujahideen, and Saudi jihadists fought Soviet forces on the front lines, Saudi Marxists were celebrating the advances of socialism alongside their Afghan comrades.

Although the CPSA (Communist Party of Saudi Arabia) continued its activities, it faced its own existential crisis when the Soviet Union encountered severe turmoil. Magazines that frequently published CPSA articles and statements, such as World Marxist Review and The Path, ceased publication. At the CPSA's Third Congress held in August 1989, influenced by Gorbachev's "new thinking," the party adopted a series of discourses on "democracy" and "human rights" and halted its own publications. However, the CPSA did not disband immediately.

As the Cold War drew to a close, Saddam Hussein suddenly invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The Gulf region became the focus of global attention. The CPSA initially condemned Iraq's action, but shifted its stance after the US deployed troops to Saudi Arabia for the "liberation" of Kuwait, instead condemning "American aggression" aimed at "destroying fraternal Iraq." This statement appeared to legitimize the Iraqi invasion, framing it as Iraq's "legitimate Pan-Arab struggle for the Arab nation to restore its usurped rights." However, after the war, the CPSA, alongside other Marxist-Leninist (ML) organizations in the Gulf, praised the "liberation of Kuwait," while expressing regret over the destruction inflicted on Iraq and the central role of the US in the operation. These organizations emphasized the importance of strengthening "Gulf solidarity based on the will of the people and democratic foundations."

The Gulf crisis led to a rapid reconciliation between the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia. The two countries reestablished diplomatic relations in September 1990. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia and other wealthy donors from Gulf states offered a $3 billion loan package to the struggling Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Saudi-Syrian relations also improved significantly, as the Syrian Ba'athist regime—a bitter enemy of Iraq's Ba'athists—had cooperated with the international coalition against Kuwait. Consequently, some CPSA members based in Damascus had to relocate to London.

On May 22, 1990, North Yemen and South Yemen unified, marking the end of the only Soviet-style socialist state in the Arab region.

In Saudi Arabia, fueled by opposition to the US military presence, a Muslim-led opposition movement gradually emerged. Some of the petitions submitted to the King were jointly signed by the CPSA and Islamists. Unlike before, the names of all participants were to be published, significantly increasing the risks for those involved. Influenced by this atmosphere of openness, the CPSA gradually abandoned its radical stances and shifted its focus to "democratic" issues.

In March 1991, the CPSA reorganized itself into the National Democratic Group in Saudi Arabia (NDGS; al-tajammuʿ al-watani al-dimuqrati fi al-suʿudiyya), renouncing Marxism and Communism and marking its definitive transformation.

Other opposition groups also moderated their positions. The Socialist Labour Party announced the suspension of its activities, and in return, its imprisoned members were released in 1991. The Shi'ite Organization for Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula (OIRAP) changed its name to the Reformist Movement in Saudi Arabia (RMS; al-haraka-islahiyya fi al-suʿudiyya) and began negotiating with the Saudi government over amnesty. Due to the CPSA's close ties with the RMS, it was also drawn into the negotiation process. In 1993, an agreement was reached between the RMS and the Saudi government. CPSA members within Saudi Arabia also held talks in Riyadh with Crown Prince Abdullah. They received security assurances from the Crown Prince and were informed they would be allowed to travel and work in Saudi Arabia on the condition of ceasing political activities. In the summer of 1993, the remaining CPSA members abroad were granted amnesty.

In the summer of 1993, the remaining overseas communists received political amnesty, and former CPSA leader Mahdi Habib was permitted to settle in the Arab world.

Thus ended the story of the CPSA. But the flame was not entirely extinguished. Petitions submitted to the King in 2003 and 2004 still contained viewpoints once promoted by the CPSA and its predecessor, the National Liberation Front (NLF), indicating that CPSA ideas continued to influence a significant segment of intellectuals. After the CPSA reached its end, many of its former members became prominent figures in Saudi culture and the public sphere. Their writings still shimmer with fragments of revolutionary ideals.

In 1951, King Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia boasted to an American general that if they found a Communist in Saudi Arabia, they could behead him before the tea got cold. But, as this text has shown, they did exist and persisted for decades within that very environment. Even beneath the holy cities marked by the crescent and the Shahada, within inconspicuous piles of ashes, the embers of revolution remain forever buried.